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Abstract
Sex worker parents often lose custody of their children. The purpose of this research was to determine
what impact the status of a parent as a past or present sex worker has had on judicial decision-making in
custody and access disputes.
Through doctrinal legal research, I explored judicial treatment of sex worker parents in custody and access
disputes in Ontario Child Protection and Family Law case law. Parental involvement in sex work was often
presented as an unfavourable aspect of the parent, or otherwise had a negative influence on their claim.
Sex work was treated as a negative quality in a parent rather than an aspect of their life warranting further
factual exploration. I argue that stigma against sex workers appears to carry more weight in custody and
access disputes than evidence concerning the impact that a parent’s engagement in sex work has on a
child.
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Introduction
I run a small legal clinic where I provide free summary legal advice for sex workers in cooperation with
Maggie’s: Toronto Sex Workers’ Action Project (“Maggie’s”). Maggie’s is a non-profit organization run by
and for sex workers in Toronto.
At first, I expected that most of my clients would seek advice in the criminal context. Following
amendments to the prostitution provisions of the Criminal Code in 2014, it is no longer a crime to
communicate in public for the purpose of selling sexual services in Canada. Sex workers nevertheless still
risk running into trouble with the law.1 For example, the Criminal Code prohibits communicating for the
purpose of obtaining sexual services, meaning that clients of sex workers commit an offense with each
transaction.2 The Criminal Code also prohibits all communications regarding the commodification of
sexual services near schools or playgrounds; stopping or impeding pedestrian or vehicular traffic for the
purpose of selling sexual services; and advertising sexual services on behalf of another person (i.e., a
business partner).3
I was wrong. Many of my clients are mothers who are involved in or threatened with Family Law or Child
Protection proceedings and fear losing their children if they are outed as sex workers. Unfortunately, I
found it challenging to provide them with legal advice because I was unable to find any resources on the
challenges a sex worker might expect to face during custody and access proceedings.
The purpose of this research was to understand the impact that parental engagement in sex work has had
on custody and access proceedings in Ontario. My research question is as follows:

1

In Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 [Bedford], the Supreme Court of Canada struck down
provisions in the Criminal Code, RSC, 1985, c C-46 governing the commodification of sexual services for violating s. 7
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
2
Criminal Code, ibid, s 286.2.
3
Ibid, ss 231 (1)-(2), 286.4, 286.5 (1)-(2).

1

In reported decisions from Family Law and Child Protection proceedings involving claims for
custody and access, what impact has the status of a parent as a past or present sex worker had
on judicial decision-making?
I explored judicial consideration and treatment of parental involvement in sex work in custody and access
proceedings brought under Ontario Child Protection legislation (the Child and Family Services Act and the
Child, Youth, and Family Services Act, 2017) and Family Law legislation (the Children’s Law Reform Act and
the Divorce Act).4
I found that, in many cases, judges appeared to rely upon stigma and assumptions about sex work and sex
workers instead of on evidence about the specific sex worker parent, their work, and any impact on the
child. Parents were often labeled as prostitutes early on in decisions, followed by seemingly adverse
inferences about the sex worker’s parenting abilities based on that status. I thus argue that stigma against
sex work and sex workers appears to carry more weight in custody and access disputes than evidence
concerning the impact that a parent’s engagement in sex work has on a child.
Chapter 1 begins with an overview of the history of Canada’s prostitution laws, followed by a description
of what I have come to learn about sex worker parents. I explain the status of the emerging field of
research on the intersections between parenthood and sex work, define key terms, and provide a glimpse
of the diverse professional and personal lives of sex workers.
In Chapter 2, I describe my research method. Briefly, I took a positivist approach to doctrinal legal research
to determine how a parent’s status as a sex worker has been treated by Family Law and Child Protection
courts from January 1, 2010 to March 2020.
Chapters 3 and 4 are the heart of this work. They contain legal analyses of case law that demonstrate how
a parent’s status as a sex work has been considered and applied in Child Protection and Family Law
proceedings where custody and access of a child is disputed. In Chapter 5 I discuss key conclusions and
observations and suggest areas for future research.

4

Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c C.11 [CFSA]; Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, SO 2017, c 14,
Sched. 1 [CYFSA, 2017]; Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c C.12 [CLRA]; Divorce Act, RSC, 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp)
[Divorce Act].
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Chapter 1 – Background
In this chapter, I set out the theoretical framework for my research question. I start with an overview of
Canada’s past and present models of regulating prostitution under the Criminal Code.5 While my research
concerns Child Protection and Family Law, criminal prostitution laws regulate the lives and careers of sex
workers. I then define sex work, sex workers, and stigma, and describe the stigma experienced by sex
workers.6
The balance is dedicated to literature by and about sex worker parents, including anthologies, blog posts,
activist pieces, and academic (sociological and sociolegal) studies. We see that sex worker parents are
abundant7 yet understudied;8 encounter high rates of stigma and scrutiny;9 suffer disproportionately high
child apprehension rates;10 and often face at least one social, economic, or health impediment that can
impede parenting.11 However, there is a lack of literature regarding the legal impact of parental
involvement in sex work on Child Protection and Family Law custody and access proceedings.
I conclude by explaining how my legal research contributes to the field of study on sex work and parenting.
As I later describe in my methodology chapter, I explored this impact by reviewing judicial analyses within
Ontario case law.

5

Criminal Code, supra note 1.
Emily van der Meulen, Elya M Durisin, & Victoria Love, eds, Selling Sex: Experience, advocacy, and research on sex
work in Canada (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2013) at 3.
7
Juliana Piccillo, “We’re here. We’re whores. We’re parenting.” (February 20, 2018) online: Red Umbrella Babies:
Sex work & Parenting, an anthology <https://www.redumbrellababies.com/single-post/2018/02/20/Were-hereWere-whores-Were-parenting>.
8
Rebecca Bromwich & Monique Marie Dejong, eds, Mothers, mothering and sex work (Brampton, ON: Demeter
Press, 2015) at 14.
9
See generally, Bromwich & DeJong, ibid.
10
Putu Duff et al, “Sex Work and Motherhood: Social and Structural Barriers to Health and Social Services for
Pregnant and Parenting Street and Off-Street Sex Workers” (2015) 36:9 Health Care for Women International 1039
at 1040 [Duff et al (2015)].
11
Susan Dewey, Treena Orchard & Kyria Brown. “Shared Precarities and Maternal Subjectivities: Navigating
Motherhood and Child Custody Loss Among North American Women in Street-Based Sex Work” (2018) 46:1 Ethos
27.
6
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Prostitution laws in Canada
1892-2014: Canada’s former prohibition model
Up until 2014, the Criminal Code prescribed a prohibition model of regulating the purchase and sale of
sexual services. Prohibition models work to eliminate prostitution based on the assumption that sex work
is inherently violent and harmful.12
The Criminal Code did not explicitly prohibit the sale of one’s own sexual services but contained broad
prohibitions against almost every behaviour that a sex worker would have to engage in in order to enter
into a transaction with a client. The following actions related to sex work were prohibited under the
Criminal Code from its enactment in 1892 to 2014:13
1) In any manner, communicating or attempting to communicate in a public place or in any place
open to public view with any person for the purpose of selling or obtaining sexual services.14
2) Keeping, being in, or having charge or control of a common bawdy-house.15 A “common bawdyhouse” was defined as a place kept, occupied, or resorted to by one or more persons for the
purpose of prostitution or the practice of acts of indecency.16
3) Living wholly or in part on the avails of prostitution of another person.17 Known as the “pimping
provision”, this prohibition could theoretically capture employees of or family members living
with sex workers.

The Bedford decision
In 2010, three sex workers from Ontario sought declarations that the following provisions of the Criminal
Code governing prostitution violated their section 7 Charter right to life, liberty, and security of the person:

12

John Lowman, “Crown Expert-Witness Testimony in Bedford v Canada: Evidence-Based Argument of VictimParadigm Hyperbole?” in Chapter 15 of van der Meulen, Durisin, & Love, supra note 6 at 233.
13
The Criminal Code, 1892, SC 1892, c 29; Criminal Code, ibid.
14
Criminal Code, ibid, s 213(1)(b) (repealed).
15
Ibid, s 210(1)-(2) (repealed).
16
Ibid, s 197(1) (repealed).
17
Ibid, s 212(1)(j) (repealed).
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1) the prohibition against keeping or being in a common bawdy-house;
2) the prohibition against living on the avails of prostitution; and
3) the prohibition against communicating in public for the purposes of prostitution.18
Their application went before the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) in 2013.19 The SCC held that all of the
impugned provisions were inconsistent with section 7 of the Charter. First, the Court held that the harm
suffered by sex workers as a result of the prohibition against keeping a bawdy house—preventing sex
workers from working in safer fixed indoor locations and from resorting to safe houses—was grossly
disproportionate to the purpose of deterring community disruption.20
Second, the SCC held that the prohibition against living off the avails of prostitution, targeted at parasitic
and exploitative pimps, was overbroad in that it also captured those who could increase the safety and
security of sex workers, such as drivers, managers, bodyguards, accountants, receptionists, or anyone else
involved in business with sex workers.21
Third, the SCC held purpose of the prohibition against communicating in public for the purpose of
prostitution—taking prostitution off the street in order to prevent public nuisance—was grossly
disproportionate to the negative impact the law had on the safety and lives of sex workers who were thus
prevented from screening potential clients for intoxication and propensity to violence.22
The Court ordered a declaration of invalidity for the three impugned decisions, suspended for one year to
allow Parliament time to prepare amending legislation.23

18

Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2010 ONSC 4264.
Bedford, supra note 1.
20
Ibid at paras 133-136.
21
Ibid at paras 139-144.
22
Ibid at para 159.
23
Ibid at para 169.
19
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2014: Parliament enacts a Nordic model
In 2014, Parliament amended the Criminal Code to implement a Nordic model of regulating sex work that
is in effect today.24 The commodification of sex work remains criminalized, but the laws target purchasers
of sexual services (i.e., the clients of sex workers) instead of sex workers. Parliament replaced the
provisions struck down in Bedford with the following offenses:
1) Purchasing offense: it is an offense to obtain the sexual services of a person for consideration
or to communicate in any place for the purpose of obtaining the sexual services of a person.25
Sex workers, however, are not prohibited from communicating about the sale of their own
sexual services.26
2) Advertising offense: it is an offense to knowingly advertise an offer to provide sexual services
for consideration,27 unless the advertisement relates only to the seller’s own sexual services.28
3) Material benefit offense: it is an offense to receive a financial or other material benefit
obtained by or derived from the commission of a purchase of sexual services. Again, sex
workers are exempted if they receive a material benefit from the sale of their own sexual
services.29
The material benefit offense does not prevent sex workers from entering into certain family and business
relationships.30 Exceptions include legitimate living arrangements (i.e., children, spouses, roommates);
legal or moral obligations (e.g., supporting a disabled parent, or giving gifts); goods and services offered

24

Bill C-36, the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, SC 2014, c 25 (assented to November 6, 2014).
Of note, on February 21, 2020, Justice McKay of the Ontario Court of Justice declared that section 286.4 (advertising
ban) violates s. 2(b) of the Charter, supra note 1, and sections 286.3 (procuring), and 286.2 (material benefits
provision) violate section 7 of the Charter, all in manners that were not justified under s. 1. See: R v Anwar, 2020
ONCJ 103 at para 7. It remains to be seen whether a higher court will rule that the provisions are of no force or
effect.
25
Criminal code, supra note 1, s 286.1.
26
Ibid, s 286.5(2).
27
Ibid, s 286.4.
28
Ibid, s 286.5(2).
29
Ibid, s 286.2.
30
Ibid, s 286.2(4).
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to the general public (e.g., accountants, landlords, pharmacists, security companies); and goods and
services offered informally for fair value (e.g., babysitting or protective services).31
Pre- and post-Bedford, the Criminal Code prohibits stopping or impeding traffic for the purpose of offering,
providing, or obtaining sexual services for consideration and communicating with any person—for the
purpose of offering or providing sexual services for consideration—in a public place, or in any place open
to public view, that is or is next to a school ground, playground, or daycare centre.32
As noted, Canada’s post-Bedford legislative scheme is known as a “Nordic Model” for controlling sex work.
Under a Nordic Model, also implemented in Sweden, Norway, and Iceland, persons who sell sexual
services are not subject to criminal sanctions, but their clients are.33 Many sex workers are unhappy with
Canada’s Nordic model.34 Sex worker and activist Amy Lebovitch condemns Canada’s “terrible new laws”35
that were developed without input from the community that would be governed by them. Bromwich &
DeJong assert that the “intended normative effect” of a Nordic model is to “continue to stigmatize and
socially condemn the sex trade but to shift the social stigma from the sex workers to the consumers.”36
According to the Global Network of Sex Work Projects, Nordic models “do not reduce the scale of sex
work, but they do make sex workers more vulnerable.”37 Many sex workers are forced to operate and
negotiate contracts with clients out of public view where they are at risk of violence and exploitation.38
Nordic models “prevent[s] sex workers from working openly, and from receiving the benefits of labour
law and contract law.”39 Elements of regular (i.e., “legal”) employment—such as consistent income,
regular hours, benefits such paid time off for medical, family, or personal emergencies—are unlikely to
be available.

31

Ibid, s 286.2(4)(a)-(d); Canada Department of Justice, Prostitution Criminal Law Reform: Bill C-36, the Protection of
Communities and Exploited Persons Act – Fact Sheet (September 14, 2018) online: Government of Canada,
Department of Justice <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/c36fs_fi/>.
32
Criminal Code, ibid, ss 213(1), (1.1), (2).
33
Bromwich & DeJong, supra note 8 at 9.
34
Ibid at 10.
35
Amy Lebovitch & Shawna Ferris, eds, Sex Work Activism in Canada: Speaking Out, Standing Up (Winnipeg,
Manitoba: ARP Books, 2019) at 13-14.
36
Bromwich & DeJong, supra note 8 at 9.
37
Ibid at 12.
38
Ibid at 9-13.
39
Ibid at 10.
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Like prohibition models, an assumption behind Nordic models is that sex work is harmful to society.
Publications from Parliament regarding the post-Bedford amendments perpetuate a harm-based view of
sex work. Material published by the Department of Justice explaining the amendments confirms that the
overall objectives of the new legislative scheme are to “protect those who sell their own sexual services;
protect communities, and especially children, from the harms caused by prostitution; and reduce the
demand for prostitution and its incidence.”40 The publication explains that the government seeks to
denounce and prohibit “the purchase of sexual services, … and the institutionalization of prostitution
through commercial enterprises, such as strip clubs, massage parlours and escort agencies that offer
sexual services for sale.”41
Government denunciation of sex work in the criminal context can have extended social and legal
consequences for sex workers. Bromwich & DeJong argue that the overall governance of sex work extends
beyond criminality and, directly or indirectly, into other regulatory regimes.42 I suggest that the stigma
against sex work, in part perpetuated by the Nordic model of governance provided in the Criminal Code,
has extended into Child Protection and Family Law proceedings.

A note on alternative models
There are other options for regulating sex work that Parliament can consider aside from prohibition and
Nordic models. Certain Canadian politicians are currently advocating that Canada reconsider its approach.
Laurel Collins, Member of Parliament for Victoria, British Columbia, recognizes the dangers that the
current Nordic Model creates for sex workers by “criminaliz[ing] the environments and the very things
that would keep the workers safe” and is pushing for Parliament to consider implementing a model that
would work to protect sex workers from violence.43

40

Department of Justice, supra note 31.
Ibid.
42
Bromwich & DeJong, supra note 8 at 12-13.
43
House of Commons Debates, 43-1, No 014 (February 4, 2020) at 881, 891 (Hon Laurel Collins).
41

8

New Zealand, for example, has decriminalized sex work.44 In June 2003, New Zealand became the first
country to decriminalize sex work with the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act, 2003.45 The purpose of
that Act was to “enable sex workers to have and access the same protections afforded to other workers”
and had the following goals:
•

safeguard the human rights of sex workers;

•

protect sex workers from exploitation;

•

promote the welfare and occupational safety and health of sex workers;

•

create an environment conducive to public health; and

•

protect children from exploitation in relation to prostitution.46

Sex workers and their clients have the right to freely contract for services. They are able to implement
effective safety measures, such as performing background checks on clients, and have employment rights.
Professor Putu Duff, one of Canada’s leading academics on sex work and sex workers, recommends that
Canada follow New Zealand’s lead and decriminalize sex work. According to Duff, “decriminalization
would foster the collectivization and empowerment of sex workers and decrease exposure to workplace
and partner violence and improving peer social support networks and access to care”.47

Sex work and sex workers
I adopt the terms sex work and sex worker for this research, words advocated for by many activists within
the sex worker community.48 Incorporation of the words “work” and “worker” acknowledge that sex work
is “socially legitimate, important, and valuable work.”49

44

New Zealand Prostitution Reform Act, 2003 (NZ), 2003 No 28.
New Zealand Parliament, “Prostitution law reform in New Zealand” (July 2012), online
<www.parliament.nz/mi/pb/research-papers/document/00PLSocRP12051/prostitution-law-reform-in-newzealand>.
46
Ibid. Regarding the protection of children, it is noteworthy that the New Zealand Parliament was concerned with
protecting children from “exploitation in relation to prostitution”. In contrast, the Canadian Department of Justice
sought broadly to protect children from “harms caused by prostitution.”
47
Putu Duff et al, “The ‘Stolen Generations’’ of Mothers and Daughters: Child Apprehension and Enhanced HIV
Vulnerabilities for Sex Workers of Aboriginal Ancestry’” (2014) 9:6 PLOS ONE e99664 at 1051 [Duff et al (2014)].
48
See: Bromwich & Dejong, supra note 8; van der Meulen, Durisin, & Love, supra note 6; Lebovitch & Ferries, supra
note 35
49
Maggie’s, “Chapter 15: Maggie’s Toronto Sex Workers Action Project” in Lebovitch & Ferris, ibid at 221.
45

9

Bromwich & DeJong describe sex work as “the voluntary exchange of sexual services for money”.50
Prostitution, in contrast, is “the exchange of sexual services for money, whether voluntary or involuntary”
and can include victims of sex trafficking.51 Sex work, then, always requires a level of choice and agency.
Many sex workers are pushing to have sex work recognized as valid and socially acceptable work and
believe that lumping their work into a category that includes victims of human trafficking will hinder their
fight for legitimacy.52
Sex work is an expansive field that includes individuals with varying skill sets and from across the
socioeconomic spectrum.53 Bromwich & Dejong explain that sex work “has not always been lived in similar
material conditions … [and] has not been thought about the same way in all places and times, … [creating]
muddiness around the edges of the category of what constitutes and who is a sex worker.”54 In fact, there
are debates within the sex worker community about what counts as sex work. I recently had an informal
conversation with a woman who considered herself a sex worker, buy had been excluded from a particular
support group for sex workers because her work, which took place exclusively online, was not considered
to be sex work by the organizer. Despite debates and its diversity, it appears that most sex work that takes
place today in Canada can be classified as either indoor sex work or outdoor (street-based) sex work.
Street-based sex workers solicit clients from outdoor locations such as street corners, alleys, and parks55
and is considered to be one of the most dangerous type of sex work.56 While most people may conjure
images of street workers when thinking about sex workers, many studies suggest that only twenty percent
or less of all sex work is street-based.57
Indoor sex work can be classified as formal or informal. Formal indoor sex work occurs in formal sex work
establishments, such as erotic massage parlours, strip clubs, burlesque, micro-brothels, professional

50

Bromwich & DeJong, supra note 8 at 5.
Ibid at 5; Maggie’s, supra note 49 at 222.
52
Kate Sutherland, “Work, Sex, and Sex-Work: Competing Feminist Discourses on the International Sex Trade” (2004)
42:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 139.
53
Bromwich & DeJong, supra note 8 at 5.
54
Ibid at 5.
55
Duff et al (2014), supra note 47.
56
Rochelle L Dalla, “When the Bough Breaks ... : Examining Intergenerational Parent-Child Relational Patterns Among
Street-Level Sex Workers and Their Parents and Children” (2003) 7:4 Applied Developmental Science 216 at 216.
57
Satabdi Samtani & Elizabeth Trejos-Castillo, “Motherhood and Sex Work: A negotiation of identities” in Bromwich
& DeJong, supra note 8 at 278; Rochelle L Dalla (2003), ibid at 216.
51
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escort services, pornography studios, and other in-call locations.58 Informal indoor sex work takes place
in bars, saunas, and hotels open to the general public. Sugar babies, often young university students who
are linked with adult partners (called Sugar Daddies or Sugar Mommies) who pay for tuition and other
costs in exchange for dates would likely be classified as engaging in informal indoor sex work.59 Some sex
workers provide services exclusively online, such as through camming or other online chat services.60
Many indoor sex workers, such as exotic dancers and cam girls, provide services of a sexual nature that
would not likely be caught within the prostitution provisions of the Criminal Code.61 Such sex workers are
nevertheless relevant to my research, as I am interested in the impact of stigma—including social stigma—
against sex workers in Family Law and Child Protection courts. The scope of my work is not limited to
impacts arising out of criminal prostitution charges or convictions.

Stigma
Almost all of the sex worker literature that I encountered discussed stigma. Feminist scholar Sara Ruddick
explains that a person engages in stigmatization when they exclude someone from their designation of a
standard human.62 Nancy Scheper-Hughes describes stigma as an “undesired difference” that “makes us
turn away from another human being in fear, disgust, anger, pity, or loathing.”

63

She argues that

stigmatizing “is the most anti-social of human acts, for it consigns the victim to a living death on the
margins of human interaction.”64

58

Duff et al (2014), supra note 47 at 2.
Bromwich & DeJong, supra note 8 at 6.
60
PJ Starr et al, “Red Umbrella Babies: By Sex Worker Parents and Their Children” in Bromwich & DeJong, supra note
8 at 148-149.
61
While the Criminal Code, supra note 1, does not contain a prescribed definition of “sexual services”, it appears
that the prostitution provisions are generally understood to apply to the purchase and sale of sexual intercourse,
oral sex, and manual sex.
62
Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace (Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1989) at xvi.
63
Ibid, referring to Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Death Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993) at 373.
64
Ibid.
59
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Sex workers encounter high levels of stigma.65 Author and activist Cheryl Auger argues that sex workers
are constructed as “deviant, health or moral threats, or passive victims,”66 cast aside by family members,
policy makers, and authorities. Bruckert & Hannem assert that stigma-based assumptions about sex
workers are “embedded in social structures and subsequently reflected in institutional policy and
practice”,67 leading sex workers to often suffer verbal abuse, public shaming, over policing, and violence.68
The fact that crimes against sex workers—including harassment, rape, assault, and murder—go
uninvestigated at a much higher rate than many other members of society is just one example of the
extent to which sex workers are marginalized.69
Lewis, Shaver, & Maticka-Tyndal argue that sex work and sex workers are cast as inherently harmful to
society because they are viewed as “immoral and offensive and therefore threatening to moral order and
the stability of Canadian society”.70 This harm-based view of sex work, including the view that sex work is
inherently harmful to children, is perpetuated by Parliament. One of the objectives of Bill C-36 is to
“[p]rotect communities, and especially children, from the harms caused by prostitution”.71 Penalties for
violating the prostitution laws may be more severe if the offense is committed in a “public place that is or
is next to parks, schools, religious institutions or places where children can reasonably be expected to be
present.”72
Lewis, Shaver, & Maticka-Tyndal go on explain that “[under the guise of protecting the family, women,
children, neighbourhoods, the good of society, and even sex workers themselves, we are told it is
necessary to maintain a prohibition on sex-work-related activities.”73 They argue that, rather than relying
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on stigma and “morality-based discourse[s] of harm” to “justify and perpetuate the divisions between
‘decent folks’ and ‘prostitutes’ … it is imperative that the government commit to basing law and policy on
empirical evidence, taking a social justice stance toward the sex industry, and actively promoting the
development of a more evidence-based understanding of the people who work in it.”74
In this work, I argue that the “evidence-based understanding” of sex work advocated for by Lewis, Shaver,
& Maticka-Tyndal—as opposed to a stigma-based understanding—ought to be applied to sex worker
parents in Child Protection and Family Law courtrooms.75

Sex worker parents
Stigma against sex worker parents can have unique impacts on their legal rights as parents and their
relationships with their children.76 In the balance of this chapter, I review the literature that illustrates the
lives of sex worker parents and the impact of stigma on their identities and their children.

A note on gender
There is an unavoidable gendered aspect to this field. Research shows that the majority of sex workers
are women and most sex worker parents are mothers.77 However, in my research I came across cases78
and stories79 involving sex workers of various genders. I thus in general refer to sex worker parents and
parenthood as opposed to mothers and motherhood.
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Academic studies on sex worker parents
Sex work and parenting, particularly in North America, is a budding field of study. As recently as 2018 Dr.
Susan Dewey of Wyoming commented on the lack of studies exploring the concept of parenthood among
sex workers, and even fewer focusing on child loss.80
As the field emerges, however, so do certain trends. First, many sex workers are mothers.81 Sloss et al
estimated that 80-90% of sex workers in the United States had given birth to at least one child.82 Most
embrace parenthood and want to be “good mothers”, or good parents, to their children.83 In general, sex
workers with children “continue to see themselves as mothers when authority figures, family members,
and socioinstitutional systems do not.”84
Second, sex worker parents encounter high levels of social and state scrutiny.85 According to Susan Dewey,
sex worker parents are often “sociolegally and morally position[ed] … as fundamentally risky subjects who
pose a danger to their children”.86 Samtani & Trejos-Castillo explain that “societal disapproval of sex work
as a profession overshadows a mother’s parental role, without actually giving a sex worker mom the fair
chance to be evaluated on the merits of her motherhood.”87 As such, “sex work as a profession and
mothering stand juxtaposed”.88
Indeed, many sex worker parents describe living in constant fear of Child Protection services and for good
cause.89 A third trend emerging from the research is that sex worker parents experience
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disproportionately high levels of child apprehension.90 In one 2014 study by Duff, over one third of 350
sex worker parents interviewed reported having a child apprehended by Child Protection services.91 In a
study conducted by Rochelle Dalla involving the children of thirty-eight sex worker mothers, only ten of
105 children remained with their biological mothers. Of those remaining ten children, all had been
involved in multiple society-initiated cases.92
Fourth, while all sex workers face increased risk of child apprehension in comparison to the general
population, street-based sex workers experience higher odds—according to Duff, up to a 2.5-fold
increase—of child apprehension compared to indoor sex workers.93 The high rates of apprehension
among street-based sex workers parents appears to correlate with “multiple and intersecting
marginalizations” that can contribute to the “ongoing battle[s] to keep their children”.94 Across North
America, nearly all street-based parents experience one or more of the following social, economic, or
health barriers to parenting:95
1. Substance abuse;96
2. Domestic violence;
3. Poverty/homelessness;97 and/or
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4. Compromised mental health.98
I struggled with my decision to adopt the term “domestic violence” as opposed to violence against
women. I am aware of the dangers of removing the gendered aspect of domestic violence, given that the
majority of violence that takes place in homes involves violence against women. I also recognize that many
female sex workers experience violence at the hands of male pimps, clients, and partners. 99 However,
many of the cases I encountered in my research involved violence by and against persons of multiple
genders. I thus believe that, for the purpose of this research, it would be inaccurate to suggest that
domestic violence only included violence against women.
I refer to the above four barriers to parenting—substance abuse, domestic violence, poverty and
homelessness, and compromised mental health—as “shared precarities”, a term coined by Dewey et al.100
While social services and support are available to sex workers to assist with these shared precarities, many
fear the possible repercussions of accessing those resources.101 Sex workers report “huge discrimination
in both health and social services needs”102 and many are fearful about being open about their work with
service providers due to the risk of outing themselves as a sex worker and losing custody of a child.103
We know less about the parenting experiences of indoor sex workers. The limited resources suggest that,
in general, indoor sex workers lead higher quality lives and face lower levels of victimization than outdoor
workers.104 While indoor workers may experience shared precarities (as might any parent), many stories,
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blog posts, anthologies, and publications from indoor sex workers describe lives free from such
hardships.105 Granger-Brown et al explain that indoor sex workers may come from more “traditionally
accepted forms of motherhood, such as that of a girlfriend or middle-class wife.”106 They are more likely
to earn high incomes and live in safe neighbourhoods. Many indoor sex worker parents believe that their
work provides them with the means to be good parents.107 As documented by Benoit et al, many sex
workers reported low or flexible hours, and, in comparison to white-collar women workers, reported
higher levels of income, and job satisfaction, job security, and “skill discretion” (or the freedom to
determine which skills to use).108
Despite parenting advantages, indoor sex worker parents remain at risk of having their parenting
capabilities scrutinized due to their careers.109 Many describe courtroom battles where former partners
use their involvement with sex work to argue—sometimes successfully—that they are unfit parents.110
Juliana Piccillo, a prominent sex worker activist, stated that “every sex worker I know who’s a parent and
has gone through a divorce or separation has had their ex try to use [sex work] to take the kids away.”111
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Moving forward
Research tells us that sex worker parents are numerous, stigmatized, scrutinized by authorities, and that
they often lose legal custody of their children. For street-based sex workers, we also know that the
presence of one or more shared precarities likely contributes to their challenges in battles for custody.
Most of this information comes from sociological studies on sex workers and child loss, with data obtained
from interviews with sex worker parents. Despite the legal nature of the subject matter, there do not
appear to be any studies or analyses on the specific legal issues that sex workers face in courtroom
proceedings regarding custody and access of their children, or how evidence regarding parental
involvement in sex work has been applied by judges in custody and access disputes. In this work, I begin
exploring the legal impact of evidence regarding parental engagement in sex work on custody and access
disputes in Child Protection and Family Law proceedings Ontario.
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Chapter 2: Methodology

Doctrinal legal research and analysis
I answered my research question through doctrinal legal research. Doctrine is described by Edward Rubin
as an “inherently normative activity”.112 I took a descriptive approach, focusing on the interpretation of
the primary law and, where relevant, underlying policy.113 The purpose of this work was to provide a
positivist piece that identifies the impact of a parent’s status as a sex worker on custody and access
decisions.
As noted in Chapter 1, many actions related to sex work are criminalized. To begin, I thus confirmed the
legal status of sex work in Canada by reviewing the following:
•

Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford;114

•

Pertinent provisions of the Criminal Code regarding prostitution;115 and

•

Government, academic, and lay publications on the legal status of sex work in Canada.

Second, I searched for resources and literature discussing sex workers and parenting. I used keyword
searches (including sex work*, prostitut*, parent*, mother*, child*) at public library (Toronto Public
Library database) and online academic databases (Google Scholar, Heinonline, York University Library,
LegalTrac, Scholar’s Portal). I found little legal scholarship discussing the impact of a parent’s status as a
sex worker on custody and access decisions in both in the Family Law and Child Protection fields. As such,
I broadened my search to include sociological and sociolegal sources. I ultimately collected a small body
of research on the intersections between sex work and parenting, some of which commented on
experiences with Child Protection agencies and rates of child apprehension. Still, I did not locate any legal
analyses on point.
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Third, I identified the applicable Family Law and Child Protection legislative frameworks.116 I reviewed
treatises and textbooks on Family Law and Child Protection Law in Ontario, focusing on chapters about
custody and access, the “best interests” factors, and past conduct of a parent. Family Law proceedings in
Ontario are governed by the CLRA and the Federal Divorce Act.117 Part III of the CLRA and section 16 of the
Divorce Act pertain to custody and access orders. Child Protection proceedings are currently governed by
Part V of the Ontario CYFSA, 2017, but, prior to June 2018, were governed by Part III of the CFSA.118 I
reviewed official versions of each statute to confirm currency dates.119 I consulted annotated versions of
the above legislation to obtain a general sense of how the provisions I intend to focus on have been
interpreted and applied by the Courts, making note of any case law mentioned in the annotations that
appeared relevant.
Fourth, I compiled a list of all relevant Family Law and Child Protection case law decided under the four
legislative schemes.120 In order to be relevant to this research, a decision must have been decided in
Ontario between January 1, 2010 to March 2020; one of the issues in dispute must relate to custody of or
access to a child; and the decision must indicate that one or more parents involved in the proceeding was
engaged in sex work prior to or at time of trial. Determining whether a parent engaged in sex work as
defined in this work required certain assumptions. As noted in Chapter 1, sex work is “the voluntary
exchange of sexual services for money”121 and does not necessarily include all acts of prostitution.
However, many parents were simply described as prostitutes in the case law. For the purpose of exploring
judicial treatment of sex work, I assumed that a parent described as a prostitute or a sex trade worker
engaged in voluntary sex work unless it was clear from a decision that a parent was a victim of human
trafficking or otherwise engaged only in the involuntary exchange of sexual services for money.
I started by reviewing and noting up the case law that I identified when reviewing the annotated
legislation. I then noted up Part III of the CFSA, Part V of the CYFSA, 2017, section 16 of the Divorce Act,
and the totality of the CLRA using three legal databases: Westlaw, Canlii, and LexisNexis. While Part III of
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the CLRA pertains to custody and access, Part I discusses parentage and definitions that I believed might
lead to relevant decisions. Out of an abundance of caution, I did not limit my searches under the CLRA to
Part III. I used advanced (Boolean) search options to filter for decisions that included at least one of
following keywords:
•

Sex work*, sex-work* (captures sex

•

worker and sex-worker)
•

massage, massage parlor, and massage
parlour

Prostitut* (captures prostitute,

•

Escort*

prostitution, prostituting, prostituted)

•

Brothel

sex traffick* and sex-traffick* (captures

•

Bawdy-house

sex trafficking and sex-trafficking)

•

In-call

•

Sexual services

•

Cam girl

•

Exotic

•

Porno* (captures pornography)

•

exotic dance* (captures exotic dancer)

•

Porn, porn star

•

strip* (captures stripper, stripping, strip

•

hooker

club)

•

whore

•

drag

•

I skimmed the facts of each decision to determine whether, on its face, the proceeding appeared to
involve a sex worker parent and relate to a claim for custody and access to, or the care and control of, a
child. In Child Protection cases, issues related to the custody and access or the care and control of children
can arise during society investigations; apprehension; temporary care hearings; determinations that a
child is in need of protection (and thus state interference with custody is warranted); and orders for crown
warship, permanent society care, society wardship, interim society care, and/or adoption (discussed in
more detail in Chapter 3). I discarded decisions that did not fit these criteria. I created a short-list of twenty
Family Law cases and thirty-two Child Protection cases. I organized the final list of decisions
chronologically.
Finally, I performed a careful review of the short-listed decisions and sorted them into two categories:
cases of actual sex work to be coded and cases involving only allegations of sex work. I coded eight Family
Law cases and nineteen Child Protection cases where parental involvement in sex work was either
21

admitted by the sex worker parent or was otherwise accepted into evidence by the court. I created a list
of—but did not code—cases where parental involvement in sex work was simply alleged by a third party,
but not otherwise accepted or incorporated into the court’s analysis, or “allegation cases”. Allegation
cases are evidence of the societal view that sex work is incompatible with parenting, but do not assist with
my analysis of the impact of parental engagement of sex work on judicial decision-making. Twelve of the
twenty Family Law cases were allegation cases and fourteen of the thirty-two Child Protection decisions
were allegation cases.
For the substantive (i.e., non-allegation) cases, I recorded the following information in coding tables that
I created on Microsoft word:122
•

Citation;

•

Date of hearing and date of judgment;

•

Name of Judge;

•

Issues and ruling. For Child Protection cases, I noted the relief sought by the moving party; the
grounds for finding that a child was in need of protection; orders rendered; and any other relevant
issue before the court. For Family Law cases, I noted the relief sought (custody and/or access);

•

The Act that the decision was brought and decided under;

•

Information regarding the parties and children. In Child Protection cases, I noted the name of the
Applicant Child Protection society; the respondents’ name, gender, and sex work status (if any) as
described by the court; and the name, gender, and age123 of the children that were the subject of
the proceeding and, where relevant, any other children discussed in the decision that were not
the subject of the proceeding. For both parents and children, I included a column for “other”
information that may be informative, such as race or relationship to the child if the respondent
was not a parent. In Family Law cases, I noted the name, gender, and sex work status (if any) as
described by the court for the parties; and the name, gender, and age of the children that were
the subject of the proceeding and, where relevant, any other children discussed in the decision
that were not the subject of the proceeding. I again included a column for “other” information;
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•

A brief of the decision. Briefs included colour-coding excerpts of all references to the parent’s
involvement in sex work; applications of sex work to an aspect of the courts’ ruling; and references
to shared precarities;

•

My comments and observations; and

•

Noting-up results.

In order to better identify trends in judicial decision making within the nineteen Child Protection decisions,
I created a simple excel spreadsheet pulling out the following data regarding the sex worker parent:
•

Citation;

•

Past or current parental involvement in sex work;

•

Short summary of the court’s description of the sex work;

•

Involvement of the sex worker parent in the hearing. I noted whether the parent was actively
involved in the proceeding at time of hearing (i.e., still a party, filed some materials at some point)
and seeking custody and/or access to at least one child involved; in default; did not participate
but not noted in default; or had abandoned the proceeding;

•

Any racial or cultural information regarding the parent;

•

The provision(s) under which the child(ren) were found to be in need of protection;

•

Age(s) of the child(ren);

•

References to shared precarities; and

•

Custody and access outcomes (crown wardship; custody for the sex worker parent; other custody
orders; no access; access).

All data was included in a single row on the spreadsheet, so I could count and view trends within the Child
Protection decisions at a glance.

Limitations and alternative methods
There are limitations to my method. Many Family Law and Child Protection proceedings settle before a
hearing, or if they do go to a hearing, go unreported. As such, doctrinal research only provides a limited
picture of sex worker parents’ experiences in the courtroom.
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I considered interviews and case file reviews as alternative methods. Such methods could generate richer
data about individual cases than is available through doctrinal research. Interviews could tell the stories
from the perspectives of the sex workers, as opposed to the judges. Transcripts could reveal the stories
as presented by the sex workers’ lawyers, the sex workers themselves if they were self-represented,
society lawyers, judges, and the evidence of any witnesses. Even so, it would have been significantly more
time-consuming to conduct interviews and identify, locate, obtain, and review case files. Given that the
Osgoode LLM program is one year in duration, I would only have been able to present data from a limited
number of cases, whereas the method I adopted allowed me to explore a larger pool of data.
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Chapter 3: Child Protection
Child Protection laws allow for government intervention with families in order to protect vulnerable
children from harm. As described by the Ministry of the Attorney General, intervention by a Children’s Aid
Society, which can range from a telephone investigation to apprehension of a child, may be warranted
when “concerns are raised about a family's ability to care for a child.”124
The state’s duty to protect children and unilateral right to intervene can have a considerable impact on
the autonomy of parents and create an imbalance of power between the parties. Similar to Criminal Law
matters, parents involved in Child Protection proceedings—who are often vulnerable members of society
to begin with—have little-to-no control over the process. For example, proceedings under Criminal and
Child Protection laws are often triggered by a report to a state actor (i.e., the police or a Child Protection
agency) by a third party. A preliminary investigation led by state authorities follows. Much like a crown
prosecutor who elects to proceed with an indictment, a Children’s Aid Society can then elect to commence
court proceedings. Like an accused who may voluntarily agree to a plea bargain, a parent may agree to
enter into a voluntary care plan.125 The consequences of failing to take such “voluntary” steps are often
the same: the matter, where one party’s Charter-protected right to security of the person is at stake,126
proceeds towards trial.
In this chapter, I outline the provisions from Child Protection legislative schemes in Ontario that I noted
up for this research; provide an overview of statistics arising from case law research; and analyse the
impact that a parent’s status as a sex worker had at each step of the Child Protection legal process within
the case law.
I conclude that sex work is generally treated as a negative quality in a parent, rather than as an aspect of
a parent’s life that warrants further factual exploration. The case law suggests that courts rely more upon
negative assumptions or stigma about sex work and sex workers than on evidence regarding the impact
(if any) of a parent’s involvement in sex work upon their child in Child Protection hearings in Ontario.
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Past and present Child Protection legislative schemes in Ontario: Comparison of the former Child
and Family Services Act with the new Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017
I begin this chapter by providing and explaining the relevant legislation schemes. Child protection
proceedings in Ontario are governed by Part V of the CYFSA, 2017.127 The CYFSA, 2017, however, only
came into force on April. 30, 2018. Most of the case law discussed in this chapter was decided under the
now-repealed CFSA.
The Child Protection processes provided under the CFSA and CYFSA, 2017 (“the Child Protection Acts”)
are substantively and procedurally similar.128 Both contain comparable:
i.

paramount purposes;

ii.

triggers for commencing of proceedings;

iii.

temporary care hearings during adjournments;

iv.

elements of Child Protection hearings and available orders;

v.

factors that a court must consider when making an order in the best interests of a child; and

vi.

limitations on the admissibility of evidence regarding a parent’s past conduct.

As such, I suspect that the case law regarding sex worker parents decided under the CFSA discussed in
section c) of this chapter will remain applicable under the new legislation.

The paramount purpose of both Acts is to promote the best interests of children
The Child Protection Acts focus on the best interests of the child. The paramount purpose guiding the
interpretation and application each Act is to “promote the best interests, protection and well-being of
children”129 and, discussed further below, prescribe mandatory considerations for courts when making an
order in the best interests of a child.130
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Proceedings are often triggered by third-party reports, following by society investigations
Proceedings under the Child Protection Acts are often triggered by third-party reports made to a children’s
aid society. Subsections 72(1) of the CFSA and 125(1) of the CYFSA, 2017 impose a duty to report to a
children’s aid society on any person who believes that a child is in need of protection.131 The person must
have reasonable grounds to suspect that a child is at risk of or has actually suffered harm. “Harm” includes
actual or risk of physical harm, emotional harm, sexual abuse, neglect; and/or failure to provide necessary
treatment.132 Upon receipt of a report, a society must carry out a preliminary assessment or investigation
of the family to assess and verify the report.133

Temporary care hearings
Child Protection proceedings often have strict timelines that can only be extended with leave of the Court.
For example, s. 88(1) of the CYFSA, 2017 states that a Child Protection hearing must proceed within five
days of apprehension.134 Parties are often unable to meet such timelines for various reasons and so may
request an adjournment before the matter can proceed to trial. If the Court grants an adjournment, the
Court shall also make an order for the temporary care and custody of the child during the adjournment
period.135
The options for custody of a child during an adjournment are the same under both of the Child Protection
Acts. The Court may order that the child remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person
who had charge of the child immediately before intervention (with or without supervision and reasonable
terms and conditions); be placed, on consent, in the care and custody of a person other than the person
referred to above, subject to society supervision and on reasonable terms and conditions; or remain or
be placed in the care of the society.136
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The Child Protection Acts both provide that a child shall not be placed in the care and custody of the
society or another person, unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer harm if returned to the person who had care and control
prior to apprehension, and that the child cannot be protected adequately by an order for society
supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions that the Court considers appropriate.137

The Child Protection hearing
Once a society has decided to intervene, the society may commence an application with the Court to
determine whether a child is in need of protection.138 At a Child Protection hearing, the society must
establish that the child is in need of protection and that intervention through a court order is necessary
to protect the child in the future.139 Any order made must be in the child’s best interests.

First, a society must establish that a child is in need of protection
Circumstances and conditions under which a child will be deemed to be in need of protection are provided
in subsection 37(2) of the CFSA and subsection 74(2) of the CYFSA, 2017.140 There are no substantive
differences between the grounds for finding that a child is in need of protection between the Child
Protection Acts. In summary, under both Child Protection Acts, a child is in need of protection where:
•

the child has suffered, or there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer, physical harm or emotional
harm, either inflicted by the parent or resulting from the parent’s failure to adequately care for,
provide for, supervise or protect the child, or a pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for,
supervising or protecting the child;

•

the child has been or is likely to be sexually abused or sexually exploited, by the parent or another
person where the parent knew or ought to have known and fails to protect the child;
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•

the child requires or there is a risk that the child will require treatment for physical harm or
suffering, emotional harm and the parent does not provide or refuses to consent to necessary
treatment;

•

the child suffers from a mental, emotional, or developmental condition that, if not remedied,
could seriously impair the child’s development and the parent does not provide or refuses to
consent to necessary treatment;

•

the child has been abandoned, the child’s parent has died or is unavailable to exercise custodial
rights over the child and has not made adequate provision for the child’s care and custody, or the
parent refuses to, is unable, or unwilling to resume the child’s care and custody;

•

the child is younger than 12 and has killed or seriously injured another person, or caused seriously
damage to another person’s property, and the parent refuses to provide or consent to services or
treatment necessary to prevent a recurrence;

•

the child is younger than 12 and has on more than one occasion injured another person or caused
property damage with the encouragement of the parent or because of a failure to supervise;
and/or

•

the parent is unable to care for the child and consents to court assistance.141

Second, the society must establish that a court order is necessary to protect the child moving
forward.
If a society establishes that a child is in need of protection, they must then demonstrate that intervention
by a court order is necessary to protect the child in the future.142 The terms of the Court order must
address the specific category of harm that led to the finding that the child is in need of protection.
The terminology used for protection orders is one area where the Child Protection Acts differ. Under the
CFSA, the following protection orders were available to the Court:
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1. Supervision order: That the child be placed in the care and custody of a parent or another person,
subject to the supervision of the society, for a specified period of at least three months and not
more than 12 months.
2. Society wardship: That the child be made a ward of the society and be placed in its care and
custody for a specified period not exceeding twelve months.
3. Crown wardship: That the child be made a ward of the Crown, until the wardship is terminated
under section 65.2 or expires under subsection 71(1) and be placed in the care of the society.
4. Consecutive orders of society wardship and supervision: That the child be made a ward of the
society under paragraph 2 for a specified period and then be returned to a parent or another
person under paragraph 1, for a period or periods not exceeding an aggregate of twelve
months.143
While the orders available under the CYFSA, 2017 are effectively the same, the legislature replaced the
terms “society wardship” and “crown wardship” with “interim society care” and “extended society care”.
The following protection orders, from least to most disruptive, are now available to the Court under s.
101(1) of the CYFSA, 2017:
1. Supervision order: That the child be placed in the care and custody of a parent or another person,
subject to the supervision of the society, for a specified period of at least three months and not
more than 12 months (including any reasonable terms and conditions that the Court deems
necessary).
2. Interim society care: That the child be placed in interim society care and custody for a specified
period not exceeding 12 months.
3. Extended society care: That the child be placed in extended society care until the order is
terminated or expires.
4. Consecutive orders of interim society care and supervision: That the child be placed in interim
society care and custody under paragraph 2 for a specified period and then be returned to a
parent or another person under paragraph 1, for a period or periods not exceeding a total of 12
months.144
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Alternatively, the Child Protection Acts provide courts with the jurisdiction to make an order granting
custody of a child to a person other than a foster parent if such an order is in the child’s best interests.145
Both Child Protection Acts state that a court shall not make an order removing the child from the care of
the person who had charge immediately before intervention unless the Court is satisfied that any less
disruptive options are inadequate to protect the child.146

Courts may make orders for access
In addition to a protection order or a custody order, a judge presiding over a Child Protection proceeding
may also make, vary, or terminate an access order.147 The test for access to a child that has been made a
Crown Ward/placed in extended society care reflects another substantive difference between the Child
Protection Acts. Satisfying the test for access to a Crown Ward under the CFSA was described by Justice
Kukurin of the ONCJ as a “formidable” or “almost impossible” task.148 The CFSA provided that a court shall
not make or vary an access order made with respect to a child who has been made a crown ward unless
the Court is satisfied that:
(a) the relationship between the person and the child is beneficial and meaningful to the child;
and
(b) the ordered access will not impair the child’s future opportunities for adoption.149
In contrast, under the CYFSA, 2017, the presumption against access for children in extended society care
has been removed.150 Now, a court need only find that access would be in the child’s best interests.151
When considering whether access is in the best interests of the child, courts shall continue to consider
whether the relationship between the parent and the child is beneficial and meaningful to the child and
whether access will impair the child’s future opportunities for adoption, but there is no longer a burden

145

CFSA, supra note 4, s 57.1(1); CYFSA, 2017, ibid, s 102.
CFSA, ibid, s 57(3); CYFSA, 2017, ibid, s 101(3).
147
CFSA, ibid, 58(1); CYFSA, 2017, ibid, s 104, 105.
148
Children’s Aid Society of the Districts of Sudbury and Manitoulin v CH, 2018 ONCJ 453 at para 15.
149
CFSA, ibid, s 59(2.1)
150
Kawartha-Haliburton Children’s Aid Society v MW, 2019 ONCA 316 [MW] at para 31.
151
CYFSA, 2017, supra note 4, s 105(5).
146

31

on the parent seeking access to establish same.152 Indeed, as the Court of Appeal recently explained in
MW, under the new regime even a parent who puts forward no evidence may still gain access to a child
placed in extended society care.153

Any custody or access order must be in the best interests of the child
Any time that a court renders a protection, custody, or access order under one of the Child Protection
Acts, the order must be made in the child’s best interests. While courts are granted broad discretion to
consider any circumstance of the case that the Court deems relevant, the Child Protection Acts both
contain inexhaustive lists of considerations that the Courts must consider when rendering an order in the
child’s best interests. Under the CFSA, courts were required to consider:
1. The child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet
those needs.
2. The child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development.
3. The child’s cultural background.
4. The religious faith, if any, in which the child is being raised.
5. The importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure
place as a member of a family.
6. The child’s relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the
child’s extended family or member of the child’s community.
7. The importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the child of disruption
of that continuity.
8. The merits of a plan for the child’s care proposed by a society, including a proposal that the child
be placed for adoption or adopted, compared with the merits of the child remaining with or
returning to a parent.
9. The child’s views and wishes, if they can be reasonably ascertained.
10. The effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case.
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11. The risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned
to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent.
12. The degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection.
13. Any other relevant circumstance.154
Section 37(4) of the CFSA provides that when the Court makes “an order or determination in the best
interests of a child and the child is an Indian or native person, the person shall take into consideration the
importance, in recognition of the uniqueness of Indian and native culture, heritage and traditions, of
preserving the child’s cultural identity.”155
The definition of best interests under the CYFSA, 2017 is similar to the CFSA. Now, courts must consider:
(a) the child’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and
maturity;156
(b) in the case of a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child, the consider the importance of preserving
the child’s cultural identity and connection to the community;157 and
(c) consider any other circumstance of the case that the person considers relevant, including:
(i)

the child’s physical, mental, and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or
treatment to meet those needs,

(ii)

the child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development,

(iii)

the child’s race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, family
diversity, disability, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender
expression,

(iv)

the child’s cultural and linguistic heritage,

(v)

the importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a
parent and a secure place as a member of a family,
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(vi)

the child’s relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other
member of the child’s extended family or member of the child’s community,

(vii)

the importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the
child of disruption of that continuity,

(viii)

the merits of a plan for the child’s care proposed by a society, including a proposal
that the child be placed for adoption or adopted, compared with the merits of
the child remaining with or returning to a parent,

(ix)

the effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case,

(x)

the risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away
from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent, and

(xi)

the degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of
protection.158

For the purposes of this research, all of the relevant considerations regarding the best interests of a child
under the CFSA that are referred to in the case law remain encoded in the CYFSA, 2017.

Admissibility of evidence regarding the past conduct of a parent
Both Child Protection Acts address the scope of evidence that is admissible during Child Protection
hearings. Courts may consider the past conduct of a person toward any child if that person is or may care
for or have access to the child that is the subject of the proceeding.159 Further, certain evidence from
earlier civil or criminal proceedings is admissible. Courts may consider any relevant oral or written
statement or report relevant to the Child Protection proceeding, including a transcript, exhibit or finding
or the reasons for a decision in an earlier civil or criminal proceeding.160
In the following section, I analyze the Child Protection case law interpreting and applying the above-noted
elements of Child Protection proceedings in cases involving sex worker parents.
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Overview of results
I located nineteen Child Protection decisions discussing custody and access of children of nineteen past
or present sex workers under the Child Protection Acts. Of the nineteen sex worker parents discussed,
eleven were former sex workers and eight were involved in sex work at the time of trial. Only one regained
custody of their child. The nineteen decisions arose from eighteen proceedings, as two were appeals
within the same court file. Still, the cases discuss nineteen sex worker parents as one decision involved
the children of two fathers who were both former sex workers.
Below, I provide some of the quantitative information from the Child Protection case law. Because the
purpose of this research is to identify the role of stigma for sex worker parents, I am limited in the
conclusions that I can draw from numbers alone. We cannot draw on the words used to describe sex work,
the weight given to sex work, or the impact of other factors—such as the shared precarities that were
present in every case—on outcomes from numbers. Still, the numbers provide a startling snapshot and
serve as a starting point for this story.

Most children were found to be in need of protection due to a risk of physical harm
Seventeen of decisions contained reasons for Child Protection hearings. All of the children that were the
subject of those proceedings were found to be in need of protection (i.e., the court made a “finding”)
under one or more of the following provisions:
•

Thirteen findings that there was a risk that the child was likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by
the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s failure to
adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child; or pattern of neglect in caring for,
providing for, supervising or protecting the child;161

•

Three findings that the child’s parent was unable to care for the child and the child was brought
before the Court with the parent’s consent;162
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•

Four findings that there was a risk that the child was likely to suffer emotional harm resulting from
the actions, failure to act, or pattern of neglect on the part of the child’s parent or the person
having charge of the child;163

•

One finding that the child suffered from a mental, emotional or developmental condition that, if
not remedied, could seriously impair the child’s development and the child’s parent or the person
having charge of the child does not provide, or refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to,
treatment to remedy or alleviate the condition;164

•

Two findings that the child had been abandoned;165 and

•

Three cases where the ground for finding that the child was in need of protection was not noted.

Although not always apparent from written decisions, parties to Child Protection proceedings may agree
to a finding that a child is in need of protection on consent in advance of a hearing. In the above seventeen
cases, the Court explicitly noted in three decisions that the child was brought before the Court with the
parent’s consent pursuant to s. 37(3)(l). The parties in the remaining fourteen decisions may have
consented to the findings noted within. In any event, for the purpose of this research, the Court refers to
parental involvement in sex work when discussing the finding that the child was in need of protection in
only one case, discussed further below. In that case, the finding was reached on consent.

The most common protection order rendered was crown wardship, without access
Former sex worker parents were significantly more likely to be able to retain a relationship with their child
than parents who were engaged in sex work current to the time of trial. Five of eleven (45.5%) former sex
workers were granted custody or access. Only one of the eight (12.5%) current sex workers was granted
access.
The following orders for custody and access were rendered for the eleven former sex worker parents:
•

Five orders for crown wardship, without access for the purpose of adoption;
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•

One order for crown wardship, with access to the parent (adoption was not an option for these
children);

•

One order placed the children in temporary society care, without access to the parent;

•

One order placing the children in temporary society care, with access to the parent;

•

Two orders placing the child(ren) in the care and custody of another parent, with access to the
parent; and

•

One order granted custody to the parent following a temporary care hearing.

In contrast, of the eight parents engaged in sex work at the time of hearing, one hundred percent of their
children were made crown wards. The following orders for custody and access were rendered for the
eight parents who were engaged in sex work at the time of trial:
•

Seven orders for crown wardship, without access for the purpose of adoption; and

•

One order for crown wardship, with access. In this case, the society did not submit a plan for
adoption and so access could not impair the child’s prospects for adoption.

Case law analysis
In this section, I review and analyze case law where a parent’s involvement in sex work was considered by
the Courts in relation to one of the following components of a Child Protection proceeding:
•

triggering a proceeding;

•

temporary care hearing during an adjournment;

•

finding that a child is in need of protection; and

•

determining that an order of the court, which must be made in the best interests of the child, is
required to protect the child in the future.

I also note instances where courts refer to parental involvement in sex work to describe the parent and/or
their lifestyle, but do not connect the sex work to a particular aspect of the legal analysis.
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Many Child Protection proceedings involving sex workers are triggered by third-party complaints
and concerns regarding the parent’s work
Many Child Protection investigations and proceedings are triggered by accusations and allegations from
third parties. For sex workers, their work is often a cause for societal investigation. In eight of the Child
Protection cases, courts noted that at least one of the concerns leading to society investigation involved
explicit allegations of sex work by a society worker or a third party. Not all decisions outlined the reasons
for initial society involvement.
Third parties may be well-intentioned individuals who believe they are complying with their duty to report
a suspicion that a child is at risk.166 However, many sex workers describe being reported to societies by
vindictive former partners and disapproving family members.167
I located an additional fourteen allegation cases where a report was made to a society that a parent was
engaged in sex work and the allegation was used as grounds to investigate whether the child was at risk
of harm.168 For example, in CCAS v. BLS, GKJ, GJ SD169 the society became involved with the family due to
concerns that the mother was “involved in prostitution.”170 Later, when the child was made a society
ward, the society raised concerns with the mother’s “ongoing involvement with prostitution”.171 Justice
Pazaratz did not engage in any analysis regarding the mother’s alleged involvement in sex work, nor did
he explain what gave rise to the society’s concerns in this regard.
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Overcoming sex work supported one mother’s motion for custody at a hearing for temporary care
and custody of the child during an adjournment
In many Child Protection cases a proceeding will be adjourned before the matter can proceed to a hearing
for final disposition. If so, the Court will make a temporary order for care and custody of the child during
the adjournment period.172
The only Child Protection case where a sex worker parent received custody of a child was decided
following a temporary care hearing. In Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v RS, the mother was a former
stripper and escort.173 She successfully opposed a society motion to enter her child into society care at a
temporary care hearing. It appears that her success can be partially attributed to the fact that she no
longer engaged in sex work. Justice Kukurin began the decision by describing the mother’s life as “anything
but stable”.174 He noted the mother’s past involvement in sex work while listing a number of unfavourable
factors:
[The mother] has used both marijuana and cocaine in the past. She has been involved in
domestic violence, as a perpetrator in the case of [a former partner] of whom she was
convicted of assault. She has been employed as a stripper and as an escort.175
Justice Kukurin then described how the “pejorative introduction [of the mother] must, in fairness, be
juxtaposed to information … that is more current.” In reviewing the mother’s positive qualities, he praised
her for having “given up her job as a ‘dancer’ and … attending school to upgrade herself to a high school
diploma.”176 Justice Kukurin did not connect the mother’s sex work to an impact on the child.
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Courts often find that the children of sex workers were in need of protection due to a risk of
physical harm arising out neglect and/or failure to supervise.
In the majority of the cases where a court made a finding that a child was in need of protection, the Court
found that the child was at risk of physical and/or emotional harm as a result of parental neglect and/or
failure to supervise.
Sex work was only directly referred to by a court when justifying a finding that a child was in need of
protection in one case. In Children's Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v CT, the mother’s
involvement in sex work was included in a list of factors, including shared precarities, provided in the
opening paragraphs of the decision to show that the child was at risk of physical harm.177 First, Justice
Benotto noted that the father claimed that the mother was prostituting herself after describing the
mother’s history with substance abuse:
[5]
In 2006 the [Children’s Aid Society] received a referral from a public health nurse
who learned that the mother was pregnant again. Shortly after the child’s birth, the
mother tested positive for marijuana. A nurse observed the mother’s speech to be
slurred. Although the child remained in her mother’s care, there were incidents of police
involvement as a result of domestic violence reports. There were also ongoing reports to
the Society about the mother’s alleged use of drugs in the presence of the child. A series
of hair screens completed on the child in 2010 and 2011 showed positive results for
cocaine and marijuana. In January 2012 the father told the Society that the mother was
“prostituting herself.”178
Second, Justice Benotto noted that the mother’s sex work was included in a Statement of Agreed Facts
that the parties signed when agreeing that the child was in need of protection:
[6]
In May 2012 the parents and the Society agreed that the child should be found in
need of protection. The parents signed a Statement of Agreed Facts. The Statement
outlined and summarized the background including the following:
i.
ii.
iii.
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iv.
v.
vi.
vii.

The mother had mental health issues including bipolar disorder and
personality disorder;
The father was diagnosed with chronic pain, dysrhythmias, and panic
disorder;
Since February 2012, the father has had only supervised visits with the
child and further access would be at the discretion of the Society; and
The child is not an Indian or native person.179

These passages highlight the fact that the society took the position that the mother’s sex work, as a standalone factor, placed the child at risk of physical harm. However, Justice Benotto did not explain how the
society came to the conclusion that the mother’s involvement in sex work affected the child.

Courts have referred to parental engagement in sex work when considering what order is in the
best interests of the child
For seven of the sex worker parents discussed in the Child Protection case law, the Court referred to past
or present involvement in sex work when explaining what protection order was in the best interests of
the child:
•

In four cases, the Court suggested that involvement in sex work affected the parent’s ability to
provide stability, permanency, and/or structure for the child;180

•

In one case, the Court considered the importance of continuity in the care of the child with the
non-sex worker parent; and

•

In two cases, the Court found that the child would be at risk of physical harm if returned to the
sex worker parent.

I argue that in six of these seven cases, courts appeared to treat involvement in sex work as an adverse
factor when considering what is in the best interests of the child without considering the particular
evidence regarding the sex worker parent and any impact of same on the child. I argue that in those six
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cases, the Court’s conclusions about the parent insofar as they related to sex work were informed by
stigma, not fact.
In the seventh case, the Court directly connected the particular facts regarding the parent’s engagement
in sex work to an adverse impact on the child. The child was sexually abused by a client that the parent
had brought into the home.
To be clear, for the purpose of identifying stigma against sex workers in custody and access making, I refer
only to excerpts of the decisions that shed light on how decisions regarding the best interests of a child
appear to be influenced by a parent’s involvement in sex work. Courts often considered multiple factors
affecting the child’s best interests—at least one shared precarity was noted in each case—and the weight
afforded to all factors of any given case is not reflected in my descriptions. Child protection proceedings
are by nature factually rich and critiquing each decision on its merits based on judicial consideration of
the full factual matrix of each case is beyond the scope of this research.

The child’s need for stability, permanence, and structure
Stigma against sex work contributed to a finding that the parent could not provide the child with stability,
permanency, and/or structure for the child in four cases.
When ruling that the mother could not provide a permanent and nurturing environment in CCAS v LM,
Justice Maddalena appeared to rely upon the mother’s involvement in prostitution noted in an expert
report as evidence that the children would be at a serious risk of maltreatment if returned to their
mother.181 A portion of a report from expert witness Dr. Harris stated that “[p]erhaps the most concerning
problem area has been LM’s pervasive problems with self-regulation over the years. She has engaged in
numerous maladaptive methods for emotion regulation and self-soothing including drug and alcohol use,
self-harm (suicide attempts), and high risk behaviour (prostitution)”.182
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Justice Maddalena appeared to accept Dr. Harris’ opinion that prostitution constitutes high risk behaviour
in the absence of any evidence regarding the nature of the mother’s sex work, which I argue is further
coloured by being included in same sentence as substance abuse and suicide attempts. She relied on Dr.
Harris’ report to conclude that “it could take decades for LM to resolve the issues or indeed they may
never actually resolve. This is concerning for the Court since it leads to the inevitable conclusion that
children placed in her care would remain again at serious risk of maltreatment.”183 Crown wardship would
provide “permanency and a nurturing parent environment” that the children required and the mother
could not provide.184
Justice Curtis referred to a sex worker mother’s prior involvement in prostitution to determine that she
was unable to provide stability in Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v JB.185 In the opening
paragraphs, Justice Curtis summarized the mother’s pre-Bedford “history of criminal behaviour,
prostitution and drug use, prior to her pregnancy.”186 She noted that the mother “worked as a prostitute
and used drugs from the age of 15” and had a “substantial criminal record, with convictions for
prostitution, the sale of drugs, assault, vehicle theft and fraud. … She had 45 charges regarding
prostitution, and 15 convictions, including jail time for these convictions.”187
Justice Curtis accepted expert evidence that the mother has “good insight into her past difficulties” and
has “overcome a lot in her life”, yet still relied upon the mother’s past convictions as evidence of ongoing
poor judgment that rendered her unable to provide a stable home environment.188 The mother was
deemed not able to “provide the child with ... stability and consistency” and, if returned to her care, the
child would not have the “certainty, finality, and [the ability to] grow up in a safe and stable family, where
he is valued and protected from harm.”189 Justice Curtis ordered crown wardship without access.
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I do not suggest that Justice Curtis was wrong to consider the mother’s criminal history. Under s. 50 (1)
(b) the former CFSA, evidence of a parent’s past criminal history was admissible.190 I argue that the stigma
against sex workers perpetuated by the pre-Bedford criminal scheme contributed to the uphill battle that
the mother in JB faced during her proceedings. Perhaps the mother’s criminality in JB would have been
considered in a different light if a large portion of her record was the result of unconstitutional laws.
In Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v CH,191 the applicant society brought a motion for crown wardship
on summary judgment after learning that the mother would not be attending trial. The evidence of the
society included multiple references to the mother’s sex work:
[21] The mother has serious lifestyle problems including significant involvement
with prostitution:
a. She has a history of working as a prostitute since age 13.
b. In early 2012 the Society discovered advertisements the mother had placed through
on-line escort services. The mother admitted she placed the ads on the website, but
claimed she had never followed through with the service.
c. The mother recently advised a society worker that she had a better life when she
was involved in prostitution.192
Neither the society nor Justice Pazaratz, the presiding judge, explained how the mother’s history of sex
work, advertisement of sex work, or her assertion that sex work provided a better life impacted the best
interests of the child. Nevertheless, Justice Pazaratz relied on the society’s “thorough and unchallenged”
evidence to conclude that the mother “lacks the skills, motivation and stability to be an appropriate
caregiver for this young child”193 and ordered crown wardship without access.194
For the fourth case where a court implied that sex work impacted the child’s need for permanency, Justice
Duchesneau-McLachlan connected the location of the mother’s sex work and to her ability to provide
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permanency for the child.195 The mother in B(J) was an exotic dancer with a history of substance abuse,
which Justice Duchesneau-McLachlan discussed in detail throughout her decision. She did not refer to the
mother’s exotic dancing until the concluding paragraphs, when she noted that the mother was
“vulnerable to drug abuse and finds herself in a work environment where the temptations might be too
great” (emphasis added).196 She stated that the mother was “courting disaster”197 by continuing to work
as an exotic dancer at a location “well known” for drug use. Justice Duchesneau-McLachlan concluded
that the child needed structured caregivers who can avoid drug use, and “cannot wait any longer for his
parents to straighten out. His best interests dictate that he get a chance for a permanent home and
committed parents”198 and ordered crown wardship without access.
I agree that courts should be concerned about a parent who is an addict working in an area where drugs
are readily available, as substance abuse by a parent can certainly lead to adverse impacts on a child.199 I
suggest, however, that Justice Duchesneau-McLachlan ought to have incorporated in further fact-finding
when ruling that the mother’s drug use prevented her from providing permanency and stability. Instead,
she relied upon a presumption that the temptations “might” be too great. Further, she does not explain
what evidence he relied upon to find that the mother’s place of work is “well known” for drug use.

Continuity of the child’s care
Continuity of the child’s care with the non-sex worker parent was given preference in one case. Children’s
Aid Society of Toronto v SAP et al involved an appeal of a final order granting custody of the children to
the father by a former sex worker mother.200 The child had been in the care of the father while the mother
took a number of what appeared to be society-required steps to overcome society concerns, including
ceasing her involvement in sex work. During that time, the child developed a stable home with the father.
Justice Shore acknowledged that the mother had made “significant progress since her first involvement
with society, … overcome[ing] her involvement with drugs, escorting, and abusive partners”,201 yet held
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that it was in the best interests of the child to remain with the father. It is not apparent from either
decision what, if any, tangible impact the mother’s engagement in sex work had on the children.
The decision suggests that the society required that mother refrain from drug use, escorting, and
associating with abusive partners, and that she complied. The time it took for the mother to comply with
the terms—including exiting sex work—was the primary reason that the children were not returned to
her care. Despite praising the mother’s progress, Justice Pawagi ordered (and Justice Shore upheld) that
the most “significant factor” regarding the children’s best interests was “continuity of care.”202 The father
was granted custody of the children because “during the time that [the mother’s progress] has taken, the
children settled into their placement with their father. It would be in their best interests have that [sic]
placement be permitted.”203

Ongoing risk of physical harm
For two cases, parental engagement in sex work contributed to a determination that the child was at
ongoing risk of physical harm. First, in CCAS v. JF-G and NS, the sex worker mother sought custody and
access but could not attend trial as she was incarcerated.204 The father also sought custody. When
reviewing the evidence against the mother, Justice Mazza noted that the society worker who
apprehended the children had learned that, prior to apprehension, the mother “had been smoking crack
and prostituting herself.”205 The father gave evidence that he separated from the mother after learning
that she was “involved in prostitution and was consuming crack cocaine”.206 In his conclusion, Justice
Mazza noted that the mother’s life “was one that included prostitution, alcoholism, drug addiction, a
criminal record, alarming tendency to violence and that she is currently facing a charge of procuring young
children for the purposes of prostitution. … [T]o return the children to her care would clearly place them
risk of both physical and emotional harm”.207
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I query why Justice Mazza only mentioned, without any details or analysis, the procurement charges once
at end of the +140-paragraph decision. Procurement of children is a serious offence and, if convicted,
would be compelling evidence that the children would be at risk of harm if returned to the mother.
However, we are not provided with any details regarding the mother’s procurement charge. Further, for
the purpose of this research, it is relevant that Justice Mazza listed the mother’s involvement in
“prostitution” separately from the procurement charge, implying that engagement in prostitution is as a
negative factor in and of itself.
The mother’s involvement in sex work also had a negative impact on the father’s claim for custody in JFG. During submissions, counsel for the society argued that the father demonstrated poor judgment by
choosing to become involved with the mother. The society submitted that the father’s choice of a partner
who was “involve[d] with prostitution, drug consumption and … [was] prone to violence” did “not speak
to the success of the future family’s constellation.”208 The society further submitted that the father was
untrustworthy, in part due to “having not advised the society of [the mother’s] inappropriate behaviour,
her tendency to violence, her involvement with prostitution, and her addiction to drugs. He was
forthcoming on none of these very concerning circumstances.”209 Justice Mazza accepted the society’s
submission that the father’s failure to report the mother’s “involvement in prostitution and her
consumption of illicit drugs and alcohol while the children were in her care” demonstrated that he “clearly
… did not appreciate the importance of protecting [the children] in such a precarious environment.”210
The three children were made crown wards without access to either parent.
Courts referred to an ongoing risk of physical harm in two appeal decisions from the DD v Children’s Aid
Society of Toronto proceeding.211 These decisions contain one of the few fact patterns where the parent’s
involvement in sex work appears to have had an explicit adverse impact on the child.
In both DD decisions, the mother is introduced as a sex trade worker. Justice Horkins and Justice Pardu
both noted that the mother arrived in Canada from Romania in 1995 and “worked in the adult
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entertainment business and as a sex trade worker.”212 The father was a client and had no further contact
with the mother or the child.213
The mother’s sex work is later raised by Justice Pardu when she upheld a decision of the trial judge (which
does not appear to have been reported) to admit and rely upon disturbing hearsay evidence from the
child. The child described being sexually abused by one of the mother’s clients in the home.214 Justice
Pardu did not comment on the weight given to or impact of the child’s evidence at trial, or otherwise
substantively consider the evidence in upholding the trial judge’s order for crown wardship without
access. She only noted that the mother could not point to any trial unfairness arising from the admission
of the hearsay evidence.215
As noted, DD ONCA is one of the few decisions where an element of the parent’s particular manner of
practicing sex work (bringing a client into the home while the child is present) is clearly connected to the
harm experienced by the child (the client sexually abused the child). Unfortunately, neither Justice Horkins
or Justice Pardu considered or unpacked the connection between the child’s hearsay evidence and the
orders rendered—for example, by considering whether an order that the mother refrain from bringing
clients home could adequately protect the child in the future—in their written reasons.

Sex work as part of a negative description of a parent
For nine of the nineteen sex worker parents, the presiding judges did not appear to apply sex work to any
particular element of the legal analyses before them. Instead, judges referred to sex work as part of a
negative description of the parent and/or their lifestyle. For cases involving former sex workers, judges
referred to the parent’s past sex work without considering the limitations on adducing evidence regarding
a parent’s past conduct provided in both Child Protection Acts.216
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Prior involvement in sex work appeared in a list of negative qualities of the father in Catholic Children’s
Aid Society of Toronto v. LDE.217 The father had been noted in default, and so the Court did not consider
whether the father should be granted custody or access. The father’s involvement in sex work appeared
in an excerpt from a parenting capacity assessment. The assessment listed the father’s past behavioural
issues, including “... sexualized behaviours, prostituting himself, drug usage, theft from his parents, staying
out late, refusing to take his medication for his social disorders and acts of violence (emphasis in
original).”218
Similarly, in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. DB-S, Justice Murray referred to the mother’s sex work
when describing her past issues with substance abuse:
D.B.-S.’s cocaine use continued, on and off, for over 25 years. Her cocaine use was
accompanied by binge drinking of hard liquor. She sold drugs periodically, and eventually
sold herself, working as a prostitute.219
While the Court made no further references to sex work, Justice Murray later applauded the mother for
her efforts to overcome her addictions and maintain a positive relationship with the child. Justice Murray
refused the society’s request for crown wardship without access and placed the child in the custody of
the father—who resided with the mother—with access to the mother.
Judges condemned a parent’s choice of choosing a sex worker as a romantic partner in two cases. First, in
The Ottawa Children’s Aid Society v. CS the mother had three children with two different fathers, RP and
PS.220 Both fathers were former sex workers. Justice McKinnon referred to the fathers’ involvement with
sex work when describing their “tragic” and “hard” lives.221
Regarding RP, Justice McKinnon noted at the onset of the decision that he was “seriously mentally ill and
has had what can only be described as a tragic life as a result of his illness. He has been seriously addicted
to both alcohol and drugs from a very early age and in the past engaged in male prostitution in order to
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feed his addiction”.222 RP’s children were made crown wards, partly due to the mother’s refusal to end
her relationship with RP and parent the children on her own.
Justice McKinnon described PS as a former prostitute and pimp. PS “engaged in prostitution in order to
get drugs and trafficked in drugs for a period of time.”223 In response to accusations from a former
girlfriend that he was a pimp, PS “stated he did not feel he was a pimp but realized that he was benefitting
from her prostitution and would encourage her to do it.”224 Justice McKinnon ordered crown wardship for
PS’ daughter, explaining that that “PS’s lifestyle choices and highly unstable background make him
incapable of providing a secure, predictable and stable environment for [his daughter], to ensure her
healthy upbringing.”225
The second case involving criticism of a non-sex worker parent for their choice of a sex worker partner is
in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. RB-H.226 Justice Zisman questioned the father’s judgment and insight
partly due to the father’s “belief that the mother was a good parent to the children”,227 despite her
demonstrated inability to meet the children’s needs and her involvement with “prostitution” and “the sex
trade”.228 Justice Zisman also relied upon adverse evidence from a society witness regarding the mother,
including how the mother “admitted to … working in the sex trade”229 during an interview with the society.
I suggest that the use of term “admitted” suggests that evidence of sex work is viewed as harmful to the
sex worker’s case. Justice Zisman ordered crown wardship without access.
The mother in Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v. AS et al was an escort and did not attend trial.230 The
main issue before the Court was with respect to a parenting plan presented by the paternal grandmother
of one of the children. When summarizing the evidence, Justice Pazaratz referred to the society’s concerns
with escorting by the mother:
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[26] g. … in July 2016 the Society received information the mother was working as an
escort. Although the mother initially denied this, she eventually admitted to
escorting. She said the partner she had been living with had introduced her to this. She
later admitted to the Society that her work as an escort is one of the reasons she hasn’t
been able to attend for access regularly.231
The impact to the child appears to arise from the mother’s failure to attend access, not a specific aspect
of sex work. I question whether the society’s response would have been if the mother had missed access
for a socially acceptable line of work.
When discussing harm to the children, Justice Pazaratz referred to the mother’s decision to engage in
escorting in the same paragraph as severe domestic violence:
[26] j. [The mother] has shown no insight into the impact of exposing her children to
domestic violence. She has failed to protect them from real and foreseeable dangers
which resulted in A.S-P. not only witnessing but also suffering horrible abuse. … She
continues to pursue a dangerous and unstable lifestyle, unaware or unconcerned about
the danger her decision to escort presents to her own safety and any child placed in her
care.232
Justice Pazaratz did not explain what evidence he relied upon to conclude that the mother’s work as an
escort endangered her children, particularly when the domestic violence referred to at the beginning of
the paragraph was inflicted upon the mother by intimate partners, not by clients.233
I located two cases where sex work was relied upon to describe a parent’s problematic history and the
fact that a parent was no longer involved in sex work received favourable treatment by the Court. First,
in Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. CM, Justice Murray noted the mother’s involvement in sex
work when describing her “difficult life”.234 At a young age, the mother had been “steered her into
prostitution.”235 Prior to the birth of the child, she “was convicted of a number of criminal offences, most
of which involved possession of cocaine, prostitution and failure to attend court or to comply with
probation orders.”236 When providing an updated description of the mother, Justice Murray referred to
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prostitution and drug use as two “major obstacles to being an adequate parent” that the mother had
successfully dealt with.237 Both children were made temporary society wards with supervised access, with
one child to be returned to the mother in two months subject to a supervision order.
Second, in Children’s Aid Society of Oxford County v. CL,238 Justice Paull summarized the “traumatic
personal history” of the mother—a former sex worker—at the onset of the decision. He described the
mother as a victim, noting that she suffered from “a diagnosis of PTSD related to being a victim of human
trafficking, violence, and prostitution”.239 Justice Paull recognized that the mother had overcome difficult
facets of her life and was generally a good parent. He placed the child in in temporary society care but
noted that he would have placed the child in the care and custody of the mother had she agreed to live
apart from the abusive father.240
And finally, perhaps the most disturbing language to describe a sex worker appeared in Children’s Aid
Society of Algoma v. LP.241 Justice Kukurin referred to the mother’s involvement in sex work only at the
beginning of the decision when explaining why he would not consider placing the children with her. He
described the mother as an “attractive prostitute” with chronic substance abuse problems and as a “tragic
waste of life”.242

Conclusion
In the above cases, sex work was treated as a negative quality in a parent rather than as an aspect of a
parent’s life that warranted further factual exploration. Overall, courts appeared to rely more upon
negative assumptions or stigma about sex work and sex workers than on evidence regarding the actual
impact (if any) of a particular parent’s involvement in sex work upon their child in Child Protection
hearings in Ontario.
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In one hundred percent of the Child Protection cases, a parent’s past or present involvement in sex work
had a negative impact on the parent’s claim for custody or access at some point during the proceeding,
ranging from an unfavourable description of the parent to a contributing factor for an order that crown
wardship without access is in the best interests of the child. I argue that stigma against sex work and sex
workers is a primary driver of those negative impacts.
In seventeen of the nineteen Child Protection cases, courts appeared to accept that sex work was
incompatible with parenting yet did not explain how sex work effects the child. In contrast, the Courts
only connected a parent’s involvement in sex work with a negative impact on a child in two of the nineteen
cases.243

243

In B(J), supra note 195; DD ONCA, supra note 211.

53

Chapter 4: Family law
In contrast to the imbalance of power that is inherent in Child Protection proceedings, custody and access
disputes in Family Law custody are usually between two parents who are presumed to be of equivalent
footing. Barring certain circumstances, a child’s parents are equally entitled to custody244 and a child
should have as much contact with each parent as is consistent with their best interests.245
Chapter 4 follows a similar format to Chapter 3. First, I outline the Family Law legislative schemes
applicable in Ontario: the provincial CLRA and the federal Divorce Act (“the Family Law Acts”).246 Second,
I provide an overview of statistical data arising from the Family Law case law. Third, I analyse the apparent
impact of parental engagement with sex work on claims for custody and access in Family Law decisions.
My conclusion in this Chapter is similar to Chapter 3: for sex workers involved in custody and access
disputes, stigma can carry more weight at trial than evidence (or a lack thereof).

Family Law legislation: The Ontario Children’s Law Reform Act and the Federal Divorce Act
The Family Law Acts govern private custody and access disputes in Ontario. Section 16 of the Divorce Act
applies exclusively to married parents obtaining a divorce and Part III of the CLRA applies to all parents,
including those in common law spousal relationships.247
As with the Child Protection proceedings, custody and access proceedings brought under the Family Law
Acts contain parallel substantive and procedural elements. Both contain similar:
i.

paramount purposes;

ii.

application processes for commencing proceedings;

iii.

available orders;
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iv.

factors that a court must consider when making an order in the best interests of a child; and

v.

limitations on what evidence regarding a parent’s past conduct is admissible during a hearing.

Paramount purpose
Like Child Protection laws, the Family Law Acts work to ensure that applications for custody and access
are determined on the basis of the best interests of the child.248

Family Law proceedings are commenced by application to the Court
Custody and access proceedings under the CLRA are commenced when a parent, or any other person,
seeking a custody and access order makes an application to the court.249 Applications must be
accompanied by an affidavit that includes information regarding the applicant’s involvement in any Child
Protection or criminal proceedings, and any other information relevant to the child’s best interest. While
the CLRA does not refer to a respondent’s obligations, Rule 35.1(2) of the Family Law Rules confirms that
if an answer to an application includes a claim for custody of or access to a child, the answering party shall
also serve and file an affidavit in support of the claim.250 Under the Divorce Act, a parent seeking an order
for custody of and/or access to a child of the marriage can commence a proceeding by way of
application.251 A person other than a married spouse requires leave of the Court to make an application.252

Available orders
When making an order for custody and access under the CLRA, a court may do any of the following:
(a) grant the custody of or access to the child to one or more persons;
(b) determine any aspect of the incidents of the right to custody or access; and
(c) make any additional orders the Court deems necessary.253
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Custody orders under the CLRA may be for joint (i.e., shared) or sole custody of a child, and can pertain to
physical custody, where a child lives with the parent, and/or the right to be involved in significant decisionmaking. Once an order for custody or access has been made, a court may only vary the order if there has
been a material change in circumstances that affects or is likely to affect the best interests of the child.254
The Divorce Act grants broad discretion to courts to make orders regarding custody and access—including
interim or joint custody or access—of a child of the marriage on any such terms, conditions, or restrictions
as it thinks fit.255

Any custody or access order must be in the best interests of the child
Custody and access disputes under both Family Law Acts must be determined only on the basis of what is
in the best interests of the child.256
The CLRA provides an inexhaustive list of considerations affecting the child’s best interests.257 When
rendering an order for custody and access, courts shall consider “all the child’s needs and circumstances”,
including:
(a) the love, affection and emotional ties between the child and
(i)

each person, including a parent or grandparent, entitled to or claiming custody of or
access to the child;

(ii)

other members of the child’s family who reside with the child, and

(iii)

persons involved in the child’s are and upbringing;

(b) the child’s views and preferences, if they can reasonably be ascertained;
(c) the length of time the child has lived in a stable home environment;
(d) the ability and willingness of each person applying for custody of the child to provide the child
with guidance and education, the necessaries of life and any special needs of the child;

254

Ibid, s 29.
Divorce Act, supra note 4, ss 16(4)-(6)
256
CLRA, supra note 4, s 24(1); Divorce Act, ibid, s 16(8).
257
Ibid, s 24(2).
255

56

(e) the plan proposed by each person applying for custody of or access to the child for the child’s care
and upbringing;
(f) the permanence and stability of the family unit with which it is proposed that the child will live;
(g) the ability of each person applying for custody of or access to the child to act as a parent; and
(h) any familial relationship between the child and each person who is a party to the application.258
The Divorce Act does not contain a list of considerations. Instead, section 16 simply provides that the
Court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage as determined by
reference to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child.259

Past conduct of a parent
Under the CLRA, evidence regarding a person’s past conduct is only admissible if it relates to their ability
to act as a parent.260 When assessing a person’s ability to act as a parent, the Court shall consider whether
the person has at any time committed violence or abuse against a spouse, a parent of the subject child, a
member of the person’s household, or any child.261 Anything done in self-defence, or to protect another
person is not to be considered violence or abuse.262 In divorce proceedings, a court shall not take into
consideration the past conduct of any person unless the conduct is relevant to the ability of that person
to act as a parent of a child.263

A note on Bill C-78: Amendments to the Divorce Act
On June 21, 2019, Bill C-78, which proposed substantial amendments to Canada’s federal Family Law
regime regarding divorce, separation, and parenting, received Royal Ascent.264 The amendments will come
into effect on March 1, 2021.
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The terms “custody” and “access” do not appear in the new Divorce Act. Instead, courts will make
parenting and contact orders.265 A parenting order may contain terms and conditions regarding the
allocation of parenting time and decision-making responsibilities; means of communication between
parents, children, and other persons with parenting time or decision-making responsibilities; and any
other relevant matter.266 Contact orders contain terms regarding contact, such as visits and
communications, between a parent and a child.267 According to parliamentary debates, the change in
terminology is meant to alleviate the adversarial nature of divorce proceedings by reducing the semblance
of a winning litigant who is granted custody, and a losing litigant who is granted access.
Perhaps most significantly, the Divorce Act will be amended to prescribe a list of best interests factors that
courts must consider when making parenting and contact orders:268
(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for
stability;
(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each spouse, each of the child’s siblings
and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;
(c) each spouse’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship
with the other spouse;
(d) the history of care of the child;
(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they
cannot be ascertained;
(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous
upbringing and heritage;
(g) any plans for the child’s care;
(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the other would apply to care for
and meet the needs of the child;
(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to
communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;
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(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things
(i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and
meet the needs of the child, and
(ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the
order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and
(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety,
security, and well-being of the child.

Overview of results
Procedurally, Family Law disputes are simpler than Child Protection proceedings. Parents must only
demonstrate that the custody or access order they seek is in the best interests of the child. I have thus
organized my analysis of the Family Law cases by the parent’s status as a sex worker (past or present) and
outcome.
I located eight relevant Family Law cases and twelve allegation cases.269 Four cases involved parents who
were engaged in sex work at the time of trial:
•

One mother sought sole custody. She was awarded joint custody of the child, with primary care
to the father.

•

One mother sought and was denied custody.

•

One father sought access, which was denied.

•

One mother requested increased access to her child as a result of parental alienation by the
father, which was granted. It is not clear from the decision why the sex worker mother did not
originally have custody of the child.
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Four cases involved parents who formerly engaged in sex work:
•

Three mothers were awarded custody of the child. Courts appeared to treat the fact that the
parent no longer engaged in sex work favourably.

•

One mother sought, but was not, awarded custody. The mother had previously abandoned her
child to pursue sex work in another province. The Court appeared to approve of the mother’s
subsequent decision to leave sex work but felt that placement with a person who had cared for
the child during the mother’s absence was in the child’s best interests.

Like the Child Protection cases, the Family Law cases are factually rich. None of the Family Law decisions
were rendered solely—or even primarily—based on the parent’s sex work. Again, all of the sex worker
parents experienced at least one shared precarity at some point in their lives. Even so, judicial treatment
of sex work throughout the Family Law cases further demonstrates the impact of stigma on sex workers
in custody and access disputes.

Law & analysis
Parents involved in sex work at the time of hearing
I located four cases that illustrate how stigma against sex work can adversely impact the claims of a parent
involved in sex work at the time of a proceeding.
The mother in Fias v. Souto was a stripper and a masseuse.270 Evidence of her involvement in sex work
weakened the positive evidence that a clinical investigator from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer
provided on behalf of the mother. After testifying to the strength of the mother’s parenting skills, the
investigator acknowledged on cross-examination by counsel for the father that she was unaware that Ms.
Fias had been working as a ‘stripper’ or in a ‘body rub parlour’. The witness admitted that she would need
to understand the situation better to know how this would affect mother’s lifestyle.271
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The father in Fias raised the mother’s sex work during his evidence in chief when expressed concerns
about the mother’s parenting abilities. He gave evidence that he “question[ed] [the mother’s] choice of
employment and denie[d] that he knew of [the mother’s] previous employment (until she was three
months’ pregnant) as an exotic dancer.”272 The mother’s direct evidence was that she worked as a server
at that time, but later “admitted” to exotic dancing on cross-examination.273
When assessing the credibility of the mother, Justice Stevenson noted that the mother had been “less
than forthright with respect to providing details regarding her current employment …. I accept [the
mother’s] evidence that her current employment as a masseuse is not employment that she is
comfortable with; however, this information should have been provided to allow [the clinical investigator
to have full information before her while she completed her investigation.”274
Justice Stevenson nevertheless held that the mother was a good parent with a loving relationship with
her child and ordered joint custody, with primary care for the father. Unfortunately, part of the mother’s
success appears to have come from her apologetic attitude towards sex work. Justice Stevenson accepted
the mother’s evidence that she was not comfortable with her employment, noting that she “often feels
sick about” her work as an exotic masseuse.275 The mother’s counsel submitted that she was taking steps
to find “meaningful employment” and only worked as a masseuse to “survive”.276
Overall, it is unclear from the decision how the Court, the parties, and the witnesses in Fias believed the
mother’s sex work actually affected the children.
The mother and father in Rivest-Marier v. Emond both sought sole custody of a six-year-old boy. The
opening paragraphs of Justice Shelston’s decision contain a refreshing example of judicial neutrality
towards sex work.277 When reviewing the backgrounds of the parents, Justice Shelston noted that the
parents met when the father managed a strip club where the mother worked as a dancer, and that the
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mother worked as a dancer up until she became pregnant. Justice Shelston did not explicitly rely on the
mother’s past sex work when ruling that sole custody to the father was in the best interests of the child.
Still, the mother’s sex work had at least two adverse impacts on the mother during the course of the
dispute between the parents. First, the Court noted that relatives encouraged the father to commence
custody proceedings because they were concerned about the mother’s depression and involvement in
prostitution, and the impact of same on her parenting abilities.278 Second, at trial, the testimony of an
aunt who provided evidence on behalf of the mother was weakened on cross-examination because the
aunt “had never heard that the mother worked in a Swedish massage parlor”, a fact that mother
eventually “admitted”.279 Again, the Rivest-Marier decision does not clarify how the mother’s work
allegedly affected the children.
A parent with a long history in sex work brought a motion to restart access to her children in HP v. PLC.280
The parent acknowledged a violent history—including sexual offenses against the mother—but submitted
that there had been a material change in circumstances affecting the best interests of the children
because she was ready to be present in her children’s lives and had dealt with her charges. Her motion
was deemed to have no merit and was dismissed.
There is no question that domestic violence, which appears to have been significant in HP, can harm a
child. Domestic violence as a stand-alone factor could have been sufficient to warrant an order for no
access in HP. For the purpose of this research, however, it is noteworthy that Justice Hardman stated at
the onset of her decision that her concern regarding the past sexual abuse of the mother had been
“noted”, however there were a “number of other problems” regarding the parent’s sexual history. Justice
Hardman then proceeded to consider the parent’s involvement in sex work separately from the parent’s
violent history.
Justice Hardman summarized the evidence regarding the parent’s sex work in HP as follows:
[35]
Despite [the parent’s] attempt in her materials to suggest that her participation
in prostitution was historical, it is clear that it has continued throughout these
278
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proceedings. The advertisements filed invite paying customers to contact her by the cell
phone number used by [the parent.] Further there is the offer of “incall” times at her
home and “outcall” times elsewhere in the community. It appears that [the parent] even
offers her services weekends.
[36]
While [the parent] has denied that she entertains clients in her home, the
phrasing of the advertisements is of concern. One advertisement on the internet sets out
where she is prepared to engage in sex: “my place, his place, outdoors, restroom,
bathhouse, theatre, truck stop or gym”.281
The parent’s sex work had negative implications for the parent at five points during the decision. First,
Justice Hardman reviewed a counsellor’s report confirming the parent demonstrated an “’appropriate
understanding of normative sexual behaviour’ … and ‘was able to identify ‘pre-offense factors’ and
develop a list of warning signs to avoid.”.282 Despite the conclusions in the report that the parent was able
to deal with inappropriate sexual urges, the Court commented that “[s]urely the participation of [the
parent] as an escort-prostitute is exactly the impersonal sex risk factor that [she] planned to avoid.”283 In
deciding to give little weight to the report, the Court concluded that “Given [the parent’s] current lifestyle
both for money and leisure, it would seem that any conclusions about risk from the report must be
considered unreliable. [The parent] herself states on some of the advertisements that she is “drug and
disease free”, identifying risks that are part of her lifestyle.”284
Second, Justice Hardman appeared to reject supportive evidence of the sex worker’s parenting skills
provided by her partner’s parents. The sex worker had a child from another relationship, and the
witnesses had seen the sex worker exhibit positive parenting skills. Nevertheless, Justice Hardman
appeared to discredit the evidence from the in-laws because “whether [the witnesses are] aware of the
background of [the parent] or the life style [sic] chosen by her…] is unknown.”285
Third, Justice Hardman concluded that the parent’s online advertisements and involvement in sex work
demonstrates that she “clearly has not thought of the potential consequences of such revealing exposure
of herself and lifestyle to her own children and family. What [the parent] does on the net, for work and
recreation, is all about her and her focus on her own needs and not about any care taken about potential

281

Ibid.
Ibid at para 34.
283
Ibid at para 34.
284
Ibid at para 41.
285
Ibid at para 53.
282

63

repercussions on her children.”286 Justice Hardman did provide some factual context regarding the
parent’s sex work (i.e., in calls and out calls, working weekends) but did not explain what the “potential
repercussions” the mother’s sex work might have on the children.
Fourth, Justice Hardman appeared to accept the mother’s submissions that the parent’s engagement in
sex work was a sufficient reason to deny the parent’s request for access. Justice Hardman explained that
the mother “has told the Court that she decided that it was not in the best interests of her children [to
have access to the sex worker parent] based on all the information she had, and that the confirmation
that [the sex worker parent] continued to prostitute made her realize that it had been the right
decision.”287 Justice Hardman agreed with the mother, concluding that the sex worker parent’s “untreated
historical issues, her recreational pursuits, her risky employment and her without-boundary behaviour on
the internet would raise alarms about the suitability of any person to parent.”288 Justice Hardman
accepted that “the mother does not want the choices that [the parent] has made to be part of her
children’s lives given their differences in values. In the circumstances, her concerns are not
unreasonable.”289
Fifth, Justice Hardman concluded that the parent had a lack of focus on the children, in part because “she
could have chosen a life style [sic] that would allow her to contribute to both the emotional and financial
stability of these children.”290 In the end, despite strong condemnation for the parent’s work and lifestyle
choices, it does not appear that Justice Hardman made any connection with the sex worker parent’s
lifestyle to her request for access. She concluded that:
Perhaps the most important consideration is the fact that the children are happy, stable
and secure in the home where they are. The mother and her husband work diligently to
ensure that the girls have everything that they need. In considering best interests, the
Court must consider that family unit and ensure that no decision will adversely affect the
stability of that home.291
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While the parent “proposed to have the children come visit her and become part of her life”,292 she did
not propose a change of residence for the children or that would otherwise appear to affect the stability
of the home. Further, the Court did not consider a form of access that would not require contact between
the sex worker parent and the mother, or that the children attend the sex worker parent’s home, such as
supervised access at an access centre.
I located one case that illustrates that stigma against sex workers contributes to their risk of being
alienated from their children. Volikis & Jakubowska explain that alienation occurs when one parent tells
the child that the other parent is not a good parent, is a bad person, or otherwise attempts to “poison …
a child’s mind against the other parent.”293
In Lopez v. Dotzko, the mother, an exotic dancer, moved for increased access to because the father
continuously refused to allow the mother to see the child. 294 The father’s pleadings and evidence at trial
contained numerous disparaging references to the mother’s work as an exotic dancer. He claimed that
the mother’s profession “compromised her ability to parent [the child]”295 and was “incompatible with
‘healthy family environment’”.296 The father also claimed that she had “inappropriate relationships” with
clients, including accepting gifts.297
Justice Price found that the father’s remarks about the mother in Lopez were evidence of alienation. He
noted that parental alienation arises “from a combination of programming indoctrinations by one parent
adding to and/or colouring a child’s own feelings toward the other parent causing a negative emotional
atmosphere between the child and the parent victim.”298 Justice Price held that the father’s negative
attitude towards the mother created such a negative emotional atmosphere, and significantly increased
the mother’s access rights.
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Treatment of past involvement in sex work
I located four Family Law cases involving former sex workers. In each of these cases, the fact that the
parent left sex work was treated favourably by the presiding judge.
Griffiths v. Leonard involved a motion by a former stripper for access to a 9-year-old child. Justice Blishen
provided the following overview of the mother’s history:
[27] There is no question that Elizabeth manipulated and deceived her parents while in
a relationship with Nicolas Leonard. Her lifestyle, unbeknownst to her parents, involved
drugs, alcohol and partying. She was subjected to ongoing abuse by Nicolas Leonard,
most of which she hid from her parents who considered her to be an ideal daughter. In
addition, she worked briefly at a Gatineau strip club, which she also hid from her
parents.299
Justice Blishen found that the mother had overcome her difficult past, and was able to provide a stable,
loving home environment for the child:
Nevertheless, despite these difficulties as a teenager, I find based on all the evidence that
Elizabeth Griffiths has turned her life around. Once she terminated her relationship with
Nicolas Leonard, she obtained full-time employment, met David, got married, and now is
happily raising both Isabelle and baby Melissa with the assistance of her husband and her
parents. She has a close supportive extended family and both children appear to be
thriving in their mother’s care.300
Angus v. Angus chronicles how a mother, a former “masseuse in the adult entertainment industry”,301
expressed shame of and hid her work, left the industry, and improved her life. She was ultimately awarded
custody. The mother gave evidence that “she felt that she did not have many options without a formal
education. She did not want to return to massage following the birth of her child but felt that the family
needed the money.” The mother testified that the father supported her work because of the financial
benefit. Justice Howard accepted that the father did not object to the mother’s return to work and was
“certainly complicit in the decision.”302
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Justice Howard described how the mother experienced shame as a result of her work, noting that “[the]
job was not something that Ms. Angus was proud of, and she did not want people to know what she did
for a living. Ms. Angus strived to keep her employment in the adult entertainment industry separate and
apart from her day-to-day life.303 He was careful to note that the mother “did not engage in prostitution.”
She would “remove her clothes while she performed the massage, but there was no sexual
intercourse.”304 The mother “stopped working in the adult entertainment industry” two years before trial
and was in the process of furthering her education. The Court agreed that the mother was a “devoted,
committed mother … [and a] caring parent who is able to safely and appropriately parent [the child]”.305
When describing the background of the parties’ relationship in Melanie Gillett v. James Gratton, Justice
Charbonneau explained that “when [the parties] met, the [mother] was a sex trade worker. She was 16
years old and a heavy drug user. She had been brought into this unfortunate and dangerous lifestyle by
her much older sister, Christine, who was herself a sex worker and a heavy drug user. The [father] was 42
years old and a client of Christine.”306 The Court noted that Ms. Gillett “terminated her sex trade
involvement” when she moved in with the father. After being subjected to domestic abuse, the mother
left the father and commenced an application for custody.
Justice Charbonneau granted full custody to the mother, noting that the child had been well cared for.
Further, the Court granted the mother’s request to allow her to relocate to Germany with the child. In
coming to this decision, the Court noted that the mother “has had a very difficult and problematic period
when she was only 15 years old. She has however taken important steps to improve her situation” and
would be in a better position to continue to improve herself in Germany.307
The final Family Law case, Hernandez v. Nikas, is the only one of the four cases involving a former sex
worker where the Court connects the evidence related to the mother’s sex work and the child’s best
interests to hold that the mother should not have custody of the child.308 Hernandez involved a dispute
between a mother who worked as an exotic dancer and Ms. Stewart, a long-time caregiver of the child. In
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this case, the mother effectively abandoned her child by moving from Ontario to Alberta to dance. She
left the child in Ms. Stewart’s care for several years.309
When ruling that it was in the child’s best interests for Ms. Stewart to have custody, the Court primarily
relied upon the mother’s absence in the child’s life and Ms. Stewart’s demonstrated ability to provide the
child with structure, and a permanent and stable home.310 There was a tangible connection between the
mother’s choice to engage in sex work in a location far away from her son and his best interests. Even so,
aside from the fact that dancing was the reason for the mother’s absence, it is unclear how the act of
exotic dancing had negative impact on the child.
The evidence regarding the mother’s sex work in Hernandez was prominently used to negatively describe
the mother and her lifestyle. When summarizing the background evidence of the relationship between
the parties, Justice Henderson explained that the mother originally told Ms. Stewart that she worked as a
hairstylist in Toronto, but eventually “confessed” that she was an exotic dancer and providing escort
services.311 I again suggest that the use of terms “confessed”, like “admitted”, suggests a view that exotic
dancing and escorting are shameful activities. Justice Henderson later notes that after moving to Alberta,
the mother was “caught up in the lifestyle of an exotic dancer”.312 Again, I suggest that Justice Henderson’s
language reflects a negative view of exotic dancing.
When assessing the mother’s credibility, Justice Henderson noted that the mother “apologized so often
about the poor decisions she has made that she lacked sincerity.” The Court found that the mother did
not have the capabilities to properly parent the child, living a life in “turmoil … without stability, replete
with conflict, drug addictions, and a self-indulgent lifestyle. [Although] she has made some strides towards
self-improvement … I am skeptical to believe that she can sustain it.”313
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Conclusion
The Family Law cases further illustrate the negative impact of stigma against sex work in custody and
access disputes. Like the Child Protection decisions, in one hundred percent of the Family Law cases, a
parent’s past or present involvement in sex work had a negative impact on the parent’s claim for custody
or access at some point during the proceeding. Such negative impacts again ranged from a descriptive
aspect of a parent’s difficult past (Griffiths)314 or as a contributing factor for severing the parent-child
relationship (HP).315 Overall, seven of the eight decisions contain no indication of how sex work actually,
or even allegedly, affected the child (the exception being Hernandez).316
I noted an increase in the level of description devoted to the type of sex work that the parent engaged in
among the Family Law cases. Only one decision simply referred to the sex worker as a “sex trade worker”
(Gillett)317 and, unlike several of the Child Protection cases, none of the Family Law cases referred to the
parent as a “prostitute”.

314

Supra note 299.
Supra note 78.
316
Supra note 308.
317
Supra note 306.
315

69

Chapter 5: Discussion
This chapter contains a discussion of my results. I begin by noting that my research confirms two trends
from the literature noted in Chapter 2. I then explain the apparent impact of stigma in custody and access
disputes arising from my results. I conclude with suggestions for further research.

The case law confirms key findings of the sociological and sociolegal research
My research supports two common findings regarding sex worker parents from the sociological and
sociolegal literature discussed in Chapter 2.
First, my research suggests that the findings of Susan Dewey, Putu Duff, Kathleen S. Kenny, and others
that sex worker parents involved in Child Protection proceedings frequently lose custody of their children
hold true in Ontario.318 My results further suggest that sex worker parents involved in private Family Law
disputes in Ontario experience low levels of success at trial. For parents involved in sex work at the time
of trial, eight out of eight parents noted in the Child Protection case law and three out of four parents
noted in the Family Law case law were not granted custody of the child that was the subject of the
proceeding. Further, in all cases where a former sex worker was granted custody of a child, evidence that
the parent was no longer involved in sex work appeared to bolster their claim.
Second, my results are consistent with earlier findings that sex worker parents frequently experience at
least one shared precarity.319 One hundred percent of the sex worker parents (past and present) noted in
the case law experienced substance abuse, domestic violence, poverty/homeless, or compromised mental
health. Given the factually-rich nature of all custody and access disputes, I did not analyse or compare the
weight given to evidence regarding the shared precarities and sex work by judges, nor did I critique the
outcomes of the decisions. Such analyses would have been beyond the scope of this initial, exploratory
research.
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No apparent impact on case law from Bedford
I did not note any substantive changes to courts’ treatment of sex work within the case law following
Bedford and the 2014 amendments to the Criminal Code.320 In fact, I did not locate any decisions that
acknowledged the changes to Canada’s prostitution laws.

Case law suggests that, in custody and access disputes, courts may rely more upon stigma against
sex work and sex workers than on evidence
We know that sex workers lead diverse lives and that custody and access disputes are supposed to be
decided on the specific facts of each case. Even so, the case law demonstrates that evidence regarding
parental involvement in sex work—a broad profession that encompasses parents from across the
socioeconomic spectrum—is generally treated as an adverse factor in custody and access cases without
full consideration of the evidence of the case. Often, judges simply noted that the parent was involved in
prostitution or the sex trade. We were not told whether the parent was involved in street-based or indoor
sex work, even though such sex workers may have very different lifestyles.321 In other cases, judges
offered slightly more information by describing the particular type of sex work, such as an escort, dancer,
or masseuse. However, those judges still did not discuss other aspects of employment that would
commonly be relevant in custody and access disputes, such as hours worked and remuneration, even
though such factors can influence the parent’s ability to meet the child’s needs.322
For one hundred percent of the sex worker parents described in the case law, sex work appeared to have
an adverse impact on the parent’s claim. In all twenty-seven cases, the manner in which sex work was
presented in evidence by a party to the proceeding and/or considered by the court appeared to have a
negative impact on the views and assessment of the sex worker’s parenting capacity. However, courts
only referred to evidence about the specific nature of the parent’s involvement in sex work in six of the
twenty-seven cases (two Child Protection and four Family Law). Within those six cases, courts only drew
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connections between that evidence and an impact on the child in three cases (one Child Protection and
two of the Family Law).
The case law reveals a judicial tendency to rely upon negative stigma and assumptions about sex work
and sex workers as opposed to requiring evidence about the nature of the parent’s sex work and an impact
on their child. Many judges appeared to draw adverse inferences about a sex worker’s parenting abilities
based on labels. As such, I conclude that stigma and assumptions about sex work and sex workers appear
to play bigger roles in custody and access disputes than evidence about the impact, if any, that a parent’s
engagement in sex work has on a child. The twenty-six allegation cases suggest that sex work is assumed
to be incompatible with parenting by the community at large, further highlighting societal stigma against
sex worker parents.
I submit that stigma has no place in the courtroom. As a legal community, we must ensure that stigma
stays out of legal decisions. Reducing stigma is particularly important in proceedings involving such
marginalized populations as sex workers, and high-stakes outcomes as custody and access to one’s own
children.
I do not argue that sex work will never be relevant to custody and access disputes. The presence of sex
work likely is relevant in many cases. The sociological studies and the case law support a reasonable
concern that parental involvement in sex work may increase the risk of harm to a child, in part due to the
high correlation between street-based sex work and shared precarities. Further, there are aspects of sex
work—such as bringing clients into the home, as occurred in DD—that could directly expose a child to a
risk of harm. I agree that society workers and courts can and should exercise caution and make inquiries
into the specific facts of the case. However, the case law suggests that such inquiries are not always made.
Legal findings must be based on admissible evidence, not assumptions. Courts should not draw negative
conclusions about a parent based on a label. I suggest that so long as sex work remains publicly
denounced—by all members of society, from individuals to Parliament—sex worker parents will be
vulnerable to the negative stigma and stereotypes about sex work when authorities cast judgment on
what is in the best interests of their children.
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I am confident that reducing stigma against sex workers in the courtroom is not a pipe dream. As noted,
the case law provides some examples of judges who did not appear to jump to default conclusions that
sex work is inherently harmful, particularly Justice Shelston’s neutral description of the mother as a dancer
in the opening paragraphs of Rivest-Marier.323 Further, courts have successfully moved away from stigmabased assumptions about a parent in other contexts. As previously discussed, with respect to substance
abuse, courts recognize that their analyses must consider whether the parent’s drug use actually causes
harm to the child.324 Drug use alone is understood to be insufficient: courts must find a corresponding
negative impact on the child.325
Historically, children of LGBTQA+ parents were assumed to be at risk of harm simply due to their parent’s
sexual orientation or gender identity.326 For example, a father in Children’s Aid Society of Brant v. M(S)
was described as having “severe social maladjustment and acting-out behaviour over a period of years
during his childhood, including … gender identity issues.”327 The Court noted that the father “had not
learned how to be an adequate father”, in part because the father “has issues regarding gender identity
and cross-dressing and is in denial with respect to them.”328
In Bezaire v. Bezaire, His Honor Judge McMahon ordered that the mother, a lesbian, must refrain from
living with any other person without the approval of the court as a condition for custody of the children.329
He reasoned that he was “attempting to improve the situation and that includes navigating any open,
declared and avowed lesbian or homosexual relationship.”330 The mother subsequently moved in with a
lesbian partner. The father successfully applied for a change order, with Judge McMahon ruling that the
mother’s “changing of relationships, even the changing of lesbian partners, indicate to this court a very
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deep-rooted instability in Mrs. Bezaire.”331 While the mother’s appeal of Judge McMahon’s change order
was dismissed, Justice Arnup of the Court of Appeal stated the following in response to Judge McMahon’s
comments on the mother’s sexual orientation:
In my view, homosexuality, either as a tendency, a proclivity or a practised way of life, is
not in itself alone a ground for refusing custody to the parent with respect to whom such
evidence is given. The question is and must always be what effect upon the welfare of the
children that aspect of the parent's make-up and life-style has, and it will therefore be a
question of evidence in that very case as to whether what has been shown to exist has or
may tend to have effects adverse to the welfare of the children.332
Writing in dissent, Justice Wilson added that, in her view, “homosexuality is a neutral and not a negative
factor as far as parenting skills are concerned.”333
Further progress is seen in Whyte v. Whyte.334 In Whyte, the father underwent scrutiny because the
mother alleged that he was homosexual and a pedophile. The two allegations were coupled together
throughout the decision. Justice Grant of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia concluded that there was “no
finding that he has sexually abused the child or that his sexual orientation is alleged. … From the objective
evidence, the father has not been shown to be a pedophile nor to be homosexual.”335 Justice Grant’s
decision provides an example of judicial movement away from relying upon stigma and requiring actual
evidence of harm, ruling that “[a]s to the sexual orientation I am not satisfied that, standing alone, such
would disentitle a parent to custody. Such cases are decided on the individual facts of each case.”336
Sex worker parents are largely denied the benefit of inquiry into causation. However, with awareness,
education, and effort, legal actors can work to promote the same shift towards an “evidence-based
understanding”337 for sex workers that we have already seen for LGBTQA+ parents and parents with
substance abuse issues.
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Areas for future research
My research was exploratory. The results suggest that sex worker parents are stigmatized in custody and
access disputes due to their careers. Further research is required to understand the true impact of sex
work on trial outcomes. Research comparing case law involving sex worker parents with non-sex worker
parents facing similar shared precarities is necessary to see the real impact of sex worker status at trial.
Cases involving sex worker parents who did not experience shared precarities would also be illuminative.
As noted, I did not locate any such cases. Perhaps examples would arise through case file reviews, or
interviews. Follow-up research could also be undertaken as more cases are brought and decided under
the CYFSA, 2017.338
My results are further limited by the fact that many Child Protection and Family Law cases resolve before
trial.339 According to the results of a Survey on the Practice of Family Law in Canada from the Department
of Justice, practitioners reported that 53.8% of divorces involving custody issues and 34.2% of cases
involving access issues likely require a trial and judicial decision in order to be resolved. Qualitative
research could be done to learn about the experiences of sex worker parents involved in custody and
access disputes, and the impact of their careers throughout the legal proceedings.
Finally, the Black Lives Matter and Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women movements remind us that
there is much work to be done regarding the impact of systemic racism on Indigenous, Black, and People
of Colour (IBPOC) including during interactions with authorities.340 Black and Indigenous children are
overrepresented in the Ontario Child Welfare system.341 Beneficial research could focus on the
intersections between race and racism, sex work, and society and legal players involved in custody and
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access proceedings to determine if IBPOC sex workers experience additional negativity to the situations
of sex workers described in this research.
For Indigenous families that receive Child Protection services, Parliament recently passed new Child
Protection legislation: An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families.342 This
Act contains a new list of factors that courts must consider when rendering orders in the best interests of
Indigenous children343 and addresses many of the shared precarities faced by sex workers. Section 15
states that indigenous children “must not be apprehended solely on the basis of his or her socio-economic
conditions, including poverty, lack of adequate housing or infrastructure or the state of health of his or
her parent or the care provider.”344 Work could be done to explore the impact of this Act on Indigenous
sex worker parents involved in Child Protection proceedings and their children.
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Conclusion
No parent should fear being separated from their child due to a label. However, in every reported custody
and access decision involving a sex worker parent, the parent’s involvement in sex work was presented as
an unfavourable aspect of the parent and their lifestyle, or otherwise appeared to have a negative
influence on the parent’s claim. I conclude that in reported case law in Ontario from the last decade, sex
work was more often treated as a negative quality in a parent rather than as an aspect of a parent’s life
that warranted further factual exploration.
Of the Child Protection cases, sex work, or simply allegations of same, contributed to society decisions to
investigate, conclude that a child is in need of protection, apprehend, and/or commence proceedings. At
trial, courts have relied upon the presence of sex work to rule that it would not be in the child’s best
interests to be returned for the parent. Courts implied that sex work prevented the parents’ abilities to
provide stability, permanency, or structure for the child moving forward, or rendered the child at
increased risk of physical harm.
For Family Law cases, we saw that parental involvement in sex work was twice raised on crossexamination to discredit evidence of good parenting, contributed to another parent’s decision to bring
claims for custody, and led to alienation. In nearly every decision, courts did not refer to any evidence
regarding the specific nature of the sex worker parent’s work or make any direct connection between the
sex work and an impact on parenting or the child.
This research may be built upon by comparing my results with cases involving parents who have never
engaged in sex work and experience shared precarities. As cases are brought and decided under the
CYFSA, 2017 and An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, we may
begin to see cases involving sex worker parents who did not experience shared precarities.345 As an
alternative to doctrinal legal research, richer data on the true impact of sex work throughout a proceeding
may be available through case file reviews and interviews.
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Regardless of format, ample work must be done on the impact of stigma and systemic racism on IBPOC
sex workers during interactions with legal authorities, including those that impact their children.
Custody and access orders should only be based on evidence. Assumptions about sex work and sex
workers contribute to the uphill battle that many already face in Child Protection and Family Law courts.
The case law supports the unfortunate conclusions from earlier studies that many sex workers,
particularly street-based, experience multiple and intersecting social and economic barriers that can
complicate parenting. We must not allow stigma to be added to the list.
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Appendix A: Coding tables

Child Protection
Full citation
Dates
Judge(s)
Issue(s) and ruling(s)

Parties and child(ren)

Context, incl:
• Sex trade
• Best
interests
• Poverty
• Drug use
• Violence
• Mental
health
• community
Julie’s comments
Noted up (w/ date)

Hearing:
Judgment:
Relief sought
Finding
Orders

Held

Other
Applicant
Respondent(s)

Name

Gender

Sex worker
status

Other (incl. race)

Child(ren)

Name

Gender

Age

Other (incl. race)

Other
Overview
Facts
Analysis (BI)
Conclusion
Other
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Family law
Full citation
Date
Judge(s)
Issue(s)s and ruling(s)

Hearing:
Relief sought

CLRA or Divorce
Act/section

Held

Other (incl. race)

Custody:
Access:
Other:
Parties and child(ren)
Applicant(s)
Respondent(s)
Child(ren)

Context, incl:
• Sex trade
• Best
interests
• Poverty
• Drug use
• Violence
• Mental
Health
• community
Julie’s comments
Noted up (w/ date)

Name

Gender

Sex
status

Name

Gender

Age

worker

Other (incl. race)

Other
Overview
Facts
Analysis (BI)
Conclusion
Other
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Appendix B: Chart comparing relevant Child Protection legislative provisions
Paramount
purpose
Duty to
report

Child and Family Services Act
1 (1) The paramount purpose of this Act is to
promote the best interests, protection and
well being of children.
72 (1) Despite the provisions of any other Act,
if a person, including a person who performs
professional or official duties with respect to
children, has reasonable grounds to suspect
one of the following, the person shall
forthwith report the suspicion and the
information on which it is based to a society:

Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017
1 (1) The paramount purpose of this Act is to
promote the best interests, protection and wellbeing of children.
125 (1) Despite the provisions of any other Act, if
a person, including a person who performs
professional or official duties with respect to
children, has reasonable grounds to suspect one
of the following, the person shall immediately
report the suspicion and the information on
which it is based to a society:

1. The child has suffered physical harm,
inflicted by the person having charge of the
child or caused by or resulting from that
person’s,
i. failure to adequately care for,
provide for, supervise or protect the
child, or
ii. pattern of neglect in caring for,
providing for, supervising or
protecting the child.

1. The child has suffered physical harm inflicted
by the person having charge of the child or caused
by or resulting from that person’s,

2. There is a risk that the child is likely to
suffer physical harm inflicted by the person
having charge of the child or caused by or
resulting from that person’s,
i. failure to adequately care for,
provide for, supervise or protect the
child, or
ii. pattern of neglect in caring for,
providing for, supervising or
protecting the child.
3. The child has been sexually molested or
sexually exploited, by the person having
charge of the child or by another person
where the person having charge of the child
knows or should know of the possibility of
sexual molestation or sexual exploitation and
fails to protect the child.
4. There is a risk that the child is likely to be
sexually molested or sexually exploited as
described in paragraph 3.
5. The child requires medical treatment to
cure, prevent or alleviate physical harm or
suffering and the child’s parent or the person
having charge of the child does not provide,

i. failure to adequately care for, provide
for, supervise or protect the child, or
ii. pattern of neglect in caring for,
providing for, supervising or protecting
the child.
2. There is a risk that the child is likely to suffer
physical harm inflicted by the person having
charge of the child or caused by or resulting from
that person’s,
i. failure to adequately care for, provide
for, supervise or protect the child, or
ii. pattern of neglect in caring for,
providing for, supervising or protecting
the child.
3. The child has been sexually abused or sexually
exploited by the person having charge of the child
or by another person where the person having
charge of the child knows or should know of the
possibility of sexual abuse or sexual exploitation
and fails to protect the child.
4. There is a risk that the child is likely to be
sexually abused or sexually exploited as described
in paragraph 3.
5. The child requires treatment to cure, prevent
or alleviate physical harm or suffering and the
child’s parent or the person having charge of the
child does not provide the treatment or access to
the treatment, or, where the child is incapable of
consenting to the treatment under the Health
Care Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is unavailable
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or refuses or is unavailable or unable to
consent to, the treatment.

or unable to consent to, the treatment on the
child’s behalf.

6. The child has suffered emotional harm,
demonstrated by serious,
i. anxiety,
ii. depression,
iii. withdrawal,
iv. self-destructive or aggressive
behaviour, or
v. delayed development,

6. The child has suffered emotional harm,
demonstrated by serious,
i. anxiety,
ii. depression,
iii. withdrawal,
iv. self-destructive or aggressive
behaviour, or
v. delayed development,

and there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the emotional harm suffered by the child
results from the actions, failure to act or
pattern of neglect on the part of the child’s
parent or the person having charge of the
child.

and there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the emotional harm suffered by the child results
from the actions, failure to act or pattern of
neglect on the part of the child’s parent or the
person having charge of the child.

7. The child has suffered emotional harm of
the kind described in subparagraph i, ii, iii, iv
or v of paragraph 6 and the child’s parent or
the person having charge of the child does
not provide, or refuses or is unavailable or
unable to consent to, services or treatment
to remedy or alleviate the harm.
8. There is a risk that the child is likely to
suffer emotional harm of the kind described
in subparagraph i, ii, iii, iv or v of paragraph 6
resulting from the actions, failure to act or
pattern of neglect on the part of the child’s
parent or the person having charge of the
child.
9. There is a risk that the child is likely to
suffer emotional harm of the kind described
in subparagraph i, ii, iii, iv or v of paragraph 6
and that the child’s parent or the person
having charge of the child does not provide,
or refuses or is unavailable or unable to
consent to, services or treatment to prevent
the harm.
10. The child suffers from a mental,
emotional or developmental condition that,
if not remedied, could seriously impair the
child’s development and the child’s parent or
the person having charge of the child does
not provide, or refuses or is unavailable or
unable to consent to, treatment to remedy or
alleviate the condition.

7. The child has suffered emotional harm of the
kind described in subparagraph 6 i, ii, iii, iv or v
and the child’s parent or the person having charge
of the child does not provide services or
treatment or access to services or treatment, or,
where the child is incapable of consenting to
treatment under the Health Care Consent Act,
1996, refuses or is unavailable or unable to
consent to, treatment to remedy or alleviate the
harm.
8. There is a risk that the child is likely to suffer
emotional harm of the kind described in
subparagraph 6 i, ii, iii, iv or v resulting from the
actions, failure to act or pattern of neglect on the
part of the child’s parent or the person having
charge of the child.
9. There is a risk that the child is likely to suffer
emotional harm of the kind described in
subparagraph 6 i, ii, iii, iv or v and the child’s
parent or the person having charge of the child
does not provide services or treatment or access
to services or treatment, or, where the child is
incapable of consenting to treatment under the
Health Care Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is
unavailable or unable to consent to, treatment to
prevent the harm.
10. The child suffers from a mental, emotional or
developmental condition that, if not remedied,
could seriously impair the child’s development
and the child’s parent or the person having charge
of the child does not provide the treatment or
access to the treatment, or where the child is
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11. The child has been abandoned, the child’s
parent has died or is unavailable to exercise
his or her custodial rights over the child and
has not made adequate provision for the
child’s care and custody, or the child is in a
residential placement and the parent refuses
or is unable or unwilling to resume the child’s
care and custody.
12. The child is less than 12 years old and has
killed or seriously injured another person or
caused serious damage to another person’s
property, services or treatment are
necessary to prevent a recurrence and the
child’s parent or the person having charge of
the child does not provide, or refuses or is
unavailable or unable to consent to, those
services or treatment.
13. The child is less than 12 years old and has
on more than one occasion injured another
person or caused loss or damage to another
person’s property, with the encouragement
of the person having charge of the child or
because of that person’s failure or inability to
supervise the child adequately.

incapable of consenting to the treatment under
the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is
unavailable or unable to consent to, treatment to
remedy or alleviate the condition.
11. The child’s parent has died or is unavailable to
exercise custodial rights over the child and has
not made adequate provision for the child’s care
and custody, or the child is in a residential
placement and the parent refuses or is unable or
unwilling to resume the child’s care and custody.
12. The child is younger than 12 and has killed or
seriously injured another person or caused
serious damage to another person’s property,
services or treatment are necessary to prevent a
recurrence and the child’s parent or the person
having charge of the child does not provide
services or treatment or access to services or
treatment, or, where the child is incapable of
consenting to treatment under the Health Care
Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is unavailable or
unable to consent to treatment.

Society may
initiate
proceedings

40 (1) A society may apply to the court to
determine whether a child is in need of
protection

13. The child is younger than 12 and has on more
than one occasion injured another person or
caused loss or damage to another person’s
property, with the encouragement of the person
having charge of the child or because of that
person’s failure or inability to supervise the child
adequately.
81 (1) A society may apply to the court to
determine whether a child is in need of
protection.

Temporary
order for
care and
custody

51(2) Where a hearing is adjourned, the court
shall make a temporary order for care and
custody providing that the child,

94 (2) Where a hearing is adjourned, the court
shall make a temporary order for care and
custody providing that the child,

(a) remain in or be returned to the care and
custody of the person who had charge of the
child immediately before intervention under
this Part;
(b) remain in or be returned to the care and
custody of the person referred to in clause
(a), subject to the society’s supervision and
on such reasonable terms and conditions as
the court considers appropriate;
(c) be placed in the care and custody of a
person other than the person referred to in
clause (a), with the consent of that other
person, subject to the society’s supervision

(a) remain in or be returned to the care and
custody of the person who had charge of the child
immediately before intervention under this Part;
(b) remain in or be returned to the care and
custody of the person referred to in clause (a),
subject to the society’s supervision and on such
reasonable terms and conditions as the court
considers appropriate;
(c) be placed in the care and custody of a person
other than the person referred to in clause (a),
with the consent of that other person, subject to
the society’s supervision and on such reasonable
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and on such reasonable terms and conditions
as the court considers appropriate; or
(d) remain or be placed in the care and
custody of the society, but not be placed in,
(i) a place of secure custody as
defined in Part IV (Youth Justice), or
(ii) a place of open temporary
detention as defined in that Part
that has not been designated as a
place of safety.

Finding that
a child is in
need of
protection

Criteria
(3) The court shall not make an order under
clause (2) (c) or (d) unless the court is
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that there is a risk that the child is
likely to suffer harm and that the child cannot
be protected adequately by an order under
clause (2) (a) or (b).
37(2) A child is in need of protection where,
(a) the child has suffered physical harm,
inflicted by the person having charge of the
child or caused by or resulting from that
person’s,
(i) failure to adequately care for,
provide for, supervise or protect the
child, or
(ii) pattern of neglect in caring for,
providing for, supervising or
protecting the child;
(b) there is a risk that the child is likely to
suffer physical harm inflicted by the person
having charge of the child or caused by or
resulting from that person’s,
(i) failure to adequately care for,
provide for, supervise or protect the
child, or
(ii) pattern of neglect in caring for,
providing for, supervising or
protecting the child;
(c) the child has been sexually molested or
sexually exploited, by the person having
charge of the child or by another person
where the person having charge of the child
knows or should know of the possibility of
sexual molestation or sexual exploitation and
fails to protect the child;

terms and conditions as the court considers
appropriate; or
(d) remain or be placed in the care and custody of
the society, but not be placed in a place of
temporary detention, of open or of secure
custody.
(4) The court shall not make an order under clause
(2) (c) or (d) unless the court is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a
risk that the child is likely to suffer harm and that
the child cannot be protected adequately by an
order under clause (2) (a) or (b).

74 (2) A child is in need of protection where,
(a) the child has suffered physical harm, inflicted
by the person having charge of the child or caused
by or resulting from that person’s,
(i) failure to adequately care for, provide
for, supervise or protect the child, or
(ii) pattern of neglect in caring for,
providing for, supervising or protecting
the child;
(b) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer
physical harm inflicted by the person having
charge of the child or caused by or resulting from
that person’s,
(i) failure to adequately care for, provide
for, supervise or protect the child, or
(ii) pattern of neglect in caring for,
providing for, supervising or protecting
the child;
(c) the child has been sexually abused or sexually
exploited, by the person having charge of the
child or by another person where the person
having charge of the child knows or should know
of the possibility of sexual abuse or sexual
exploitation and fails to protect the child;
(d) there is a risk that the child is likely to be
sexually abused or sexually exploited as described
in clause (c);
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(d) there is a risk that the child is likely to be
sexually molested or sexually exploited as
described in clause (c);
(e) the child requires medical treatment to
cure, prevent or alleviate physical harm or
suffering and the child’s parent or the person
having charge of the child does not provide,
or refuses or is unavailable or unable to
consent to, the treatment;

(e) the child requires treatment to cure, prevent
or alleviate physical harm or suffering and the
child’s parent or the person having charge of the
child does not provide the treatment or access to
the treatment, or, where the child is incapable of
consenting to the treatment under the Health
Care Consent Act, 1996 and the parent is a
substitute decision-maker for the child, the
parent refuses or is unavailable or unable to
consent to the treatment on the child’s behalf;

(f) the child has suffered emotional harm,
demonstrated by serious,
(i) anxiety,
(ii) depression,
(iii) withdrawal,
(iv) self-destructive or aggressive
behaviour, or
(v) delayed development,

(f) the child has suffered emotional harm,
demonstrated by serious,
(i) anxiety,
(ii) depression,
(iii) withdrawal,
(iv) self-destructive or aggressive
behaviour, or
(v) delayed development,

and there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the emotional harm suffered by the child
results from the actions, failure to act or
pattern of neglect on the part of the child’s
parent or the person having charge of the
child;

and there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the emotional harm suffered by the child results
from the actions, failure to act or pattern of
neglect on the part of the child’s parent or the
person having charge of the child;

(f.1) the child has suffered emotional harm
of the kind described in subclause (f) (i), (ii),
(iii), (iv) or (v) and the child’s parent or the
person having charge of the child does not
provide, or refuses or is unavailable or unable
to consent to, services or treatment to
remedy or alleviate the harm;
(g) there is a risk that the child is likely to
suffer emotional harm of the kind described
in subclause (f) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or (v) resulting
from the actions, failure to act or pattern of
neglect on the part of the child’s parent or
the person having charge of the child;
(g.1) there is a risk that the child is likely to
suffer emotional harm of the kind described
in subclause (f) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or (v) and that
the child’s parent or the person having
charge of the child does not provide, or
refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent
to, services or treatment to prevent the
harm;
(h) the child suffers from a mental, emotional
or developmental condition that, if not

(g) the child has suffered emotional harm of the
kind described in subclause (f) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or
(v) and the child’s parent or the person having
charge of the child does not provide services or
treatment or access to services or treatment, or,
where the child is incapable of consenting to
treatment under the Health Care Consent Act,
1996, refuses or is unavailable or unable to
consent to the treatment to remedy or alleviate
the harm;
(h) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer
emotional harm of the kind described in
subclause (f) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or (v) resulting from
the actions, failure to act or pattern of neglect on
the part of the child’s parent or the person having
charge of the child;
(i) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer
emotional harm of the kind described in
subclause (f) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or (v) and that the
child’s parent or the person having charge of the
child does not provide services or treatment or
access to services or treatment, or, where the
child is incapable of consenting to treatment
under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, refuses
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remedied, could seriously impair the child’s
development and the child’s parent or the
person having charge of the child does not
provide, or refuses or is unavailable or unable
to consent to, treatment to remedy or
alleviate the condition;
(i) the child has been abandoned, the child’s
parent has died or is unavailable to exercise
his or her custodial rights over the child and
has not made adequate provision for the
child’s care and custody, or the child is in a
residential placement and the parent refuses
or is unable or unwilling to resume the child’s
care and custody;
(j) the child is less than twelve years old and
has killed or seriously injured another person
or caused serious damage to another
person’s property, services or treatment are
necessary to prevent a recurrence and the
child’s parent or the person having charge of
the child does not provide, or refuses or is
unavailable or unable to consent to, those
services or treatment;
(k) the child is less than twelve years old and
has on more than one occasion injured
another person or caused loss or damage to
another person’s property, with the
encouragement of the person having charge
of the child or because of that person’s
failure or inability to supervise the child
adequately;
(l) the child’s parent is unable to care for the
child and the child is brought before the court
with the parent’s consent and, where the
child is twelve years of age or older, with the
child’s consent, to be dealt with under this
Part; or
(m) the child is 16 or 17 years of age and a
prescribed circumstance or condition exists.

or is unavailable or unable to consent to
treatment to prevent the harm;
(j) the child suffers from a mental, emotional or
developmental condition that, if not remedied,
could seriously impair the child’s development
and the child’s parent or the person having charge
of the child does not provide treatment or access
to treatment, or where the child is incapable of
consenting to treatment under the Health Care
Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is unavailable or
unable to consent to the treatment to remedy or
alleviate the condition;
(k) the child’s parent has died or is unavailable to
exercise custodial rights over the child and has
not made adequate provision for the child’s care
and custody, or the child is in a residential
placement and the parent refuses or is unable or
unwilling to resume the child’s care and custody;
(l) the child is younger than 12 and has killed or
seriously injured another person or caused
serious damage to another person’s property,
services or treatment are necessary to prevent a
recurrence and the child’s parent or the person
having charge of the child does not provide
services or treatment or access to services or
treatment, or, where the child is incapable of
consenting to treatment under the Health Care
Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is unavailable or
unable to consent to treatment;
(m) the child is younger than 12 and has on more
than one occasion injured another person or
caused loss or damage to another person’s
property, with the encouragement of the person
having charge of the child or because of that
person’s failure or inability to supervise the child
adequately;
(n) the child’s parent is unable to care for the child
and the child is brought before the court with the
parent’s consent and, where the child is 12 or
older, with the child’s consent, for the matter to
be dealt with under this Part; or
(o) the child is 16 or 17 and a prescribed
circumstance or condition exists.

Protection
orders

57 (1) Where the court finds that a child is in
need of protection and is satisfied that
intervention through a court order is
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necessary to protect the child in the future,
the court shall make one of the following
orders or an order under section 57.1, in the
child’s best interests:
Supervision order
1. That the child be placed in the care and
custody of a parent or another person,
subject to the supervision of the society, for
a specified period of at least three months
and not more than 12 months.
Society wardship
2. That the child be made a ward of the
society and be placed in its care and custody
for a specified period not exceeding twelve
months.
Crown wardship
3. That the child be made a ward of the
Crown, until the wardship is terminated
under section 65.2 or expires under
subsection 71 (1), and be placed in the care
of the society.

Best
interests

Consecutive orders of society wardship and
supervision
4. That the child be made a ward of the
society under paragraph 2 for a specified
period and then be returned to a parent or
another person under paragraph 1, for a
period or periods not exceeding an aggregate
of twelve months.
37 (3) Where a person is directed in this Part
to make an order or determination in the
best interests of a child, the person shall take
into consideration those of the following
circumstances of the case that he or she
considers relevant:
1. The child’s physical, mental and emotional
needs, and the appropriate care or treatment
to meet those needs.
2. The child’s physical, mental and emotional
level of development.
3. The child’s cultural background.
4. The religious faith, if any, in which the child
is being raised.
5. The importance for the child’s
development of a positive relationship with a
parent and a secure place as a member of a
family.

74 (3) Where a person is directed in this Part to
make an order or determination in the best
interests of a child, the person shall,
(a) consider the child’s views and wishes, given
due weight in accordance with the child’s age and
maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
(b) in the case of a First Nations, Inuk or Métis
child, consider the importance, in recognition of
the uniqueness of First Nations, Inuit and Métis
cultures, heritages and traditions, of preserving
the child’s cultural identity and connection to
community, in addition to the considerations
under clauses (a) and (c); and
(c) consider any other circumstance of the case
that the person considers relevant, including,
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6. The child’s relationships and emotional ties
to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of
the child’s extended family or member of the
child’s community.
7. The importance of continuity in the child’s
care and the possible effect on the child of
disruption of that continuity.
8. The merits of a plan for the child’s care
proposed by a society, including a proposal
that the child be placed for adoption or
adopted, compared with the merits of the
child remaining with or returning to a parent.
9. The child’s views and wishes, if they can be
reasonably ascertained.
10. The effects on the child of delay in the
disposition of the case.
11. The risk that the child may suffer harm
through being removed from, kept away
from, returned to or allowed to remain in the
care of a parent.
12. The degree of risk, if any, that justified the
finding that the child is in need of protection.
13. Any other relevant circumstance.

Past
conduct

(4) Where a person is directed in this Part to
make an order or determination in the best
interests of a child and the child is an Indian
or native person, the person shall take into
consideration the importance, in recognition
of the uniqueness of Indian and native
culture, heritage and traditions, of preserving
the child’s cultural identity.
50 (1) Despite anything in the Evidence Act,
in any proceeding under this Part,
(a) the court may consider the past conduct
of a person toward any child if that person is
caring for or has access to or may care for or
have access to a child who is the subject of
the proceeding; and
(b) any oral or written statement or report
that the court considers relevant to the
proceeding, including a transcript, exhibit or
finding or the reasons for a decision in an
earlier civil or criminal proceeding, is
admissible into evidence.

(i) the child’s physical, mental and emotional
needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to
meet those needs,
(ii) the child’s physical, mental and emotional
level of development,
(iii) the child’s race, ancestry, place of origin,
colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, family diversity,
disability, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender
identity and gender expression,
(iv) the child’s cultural and linguistic heritage,
(v) the importance for the child’s development of
a positive relationship with a parent and a secure
place as a member of a family,
(vi) the child’s relationships and emotional ties to
a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the
child’s extended family or member of the child’s
community,
(vii) the importance of continuity in the child’s
care and the possible effect on the child of
disruption of that continuity,
(viii) the merits of a plan for the child’s care
proposed by a society, including a proposal that
the child be placed for adoption or adopted,
compared with the merits of the child remaining
with or returning to a parent,
(ix) the effects on the child of delay in the
disposition of the case,
(x) the risk that the child may suffer harm through
being removed from, kept away from, returned to
or allowed to remain in the care of a parent, and
(xi) the degree of risk, if any, that justified the
finding that the child is in need of protection.
93 (1) Despite anything in the Evidence Act, in any
proceeding under this Part,
(a) the court may consider the past conduct of a
person toward any child if that person is caring for
or has access to or may care for or have access to
a child who is the subject of the proceeding; and
(b) any oral or written statement or report that
the court considers relevant to the proceeding,
including a transcript, exhibit or finding or the
reasons for a decision in an earlier civil or criminal
proceeding, is admissible into evidence.
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Appendix C: Chart comparing relevant Family Law legislative provisions
Purpose

Commencing
proceedings

Orders
available

Children’s Law Reform Act
19 The purposes of this Part are,
(a) to ensure that applications to the courts
in respect of custody of, incidents of custody
of, access to and guardianship for children
will be determined on the basis of the best
interests of the children
Application for custody or access
21 (1) A parent of a child or any other person,
including a grandparent, may apply to a court
for an order respecting custody of or access
to the child or determining any aspect of the
incidents of custody of the child.

28 (1) The court to which an application is
made under section 21,
(a) by order may grant the custody of or
access to the child to one or more persons;
(b) by order may determine any aspect of the
incidents of the right to custody or access;
and
(c) may make such additional order as the
court considers necessary and proper in the
circumstances, including an order,
(i) limiting the duration, frequency,
manner or location of contact or
communication between any of the
parties, or between a party and the
child,
(ii) prohibiting a party or other
person from engaging in specified
conduct in the presence of the child
or at any time when the person is
responsible for the care of the child,
(iii) prohibiting a party from
changing the child’s residence,
school or day care facility without
the consent of another party or an
order of the court,
(iv) prohibiting a party from
removing the child from Ontario
without the consent of another
party or an order of the court,
(v) requiring the delivery, to the
court or to a person or body
specified by the court, of the child’s
passport, the child’s health card
within the meaning of the Health

Divorce Act
n/a

16 (1) A court of competent jurisdiction may, on
application by either or both spouses or by any
other person, make an order respecting the
custody of or the access to, or the custody of and
access to, any or all children of the marriage.
(3) A person, other than a spouse, may not make
an application under subsection (1) or (2) without
leave of the court.
16 (4) The court may make an order under this
section granting custody of, or access to, any or
all children of the marriage to any one or more
persons.
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Best
interests

Insurance Act or any other
document relating to the child that
the court may specify,
(vi) requiring a party to give
information or to consent to the
release of information respecting
the health, education and welfare of
the child to another party or other
person specified by the court, or
(vii) requiring a party to facilitate
communication by the child with
another party or other person
specified by the court in a manner
that is appropriate for the child.
Best interests of child
(2) The court shall consider all the child’s
needs and circumstances, including,
(a) the love, affection and emotional ties
between the child and,
(i) each person, including a parent
or grandparent, entitled to or
claiming custody of or access to the
child,
(ii) other members of the child’s
family who reside with the child,
and
(iii) persons involved in the child’s
care and upbringing;
(b) the child’s views and preferences, if they
can reasonably be ascertained;
(c) the length of time the child has lived in a
stable home environment;
(d) the ability and willingness of each person
applying for custody of the child to provide
the child with guidance and education, the
necessaries of life and any special needs of
the child;
(e) the plan proposed by each person
applying for custody of or access to the child
for the child’s care and upbringing;
(f) the permanence and stability of the family
unit with which it is proposed that the child
will live;
(g) the ability of each person applying for
custody of or access to the child to act as a
parent; and
(h) any familial relationship between the
child and each person who is a party to the
application.

16 (8) In making an order under this section, the
court shall take into consideration only the best
interests of the child of the marriage as
determined by reference to the condition,
means, needs and other circumstances of the
child.
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Past conduct

Past conduct
24 (3) A person’s past conduct shall be
considered only,
(a) in accordance with subsection (4); or
(b) if the court is satisfied that the conduct is
otherwise relevant to the person’s ability to
act as a parent. 2006, c. 1, s. 3 (1); 2016, c.
23, s. 7 (2).

16 (9) In making an order under this section, the
court shall not take into consideration the past
conduct of any person unless the conduct is
relevant to the ability of that person to act as a
parent of a child.

Violence and abuse
(4) In assessing a person’s ability to act as a
parent, the court shall consider whether the
person has at any time committed violence
or abuse against,
(a) his or her spouse;
(b) a parent of the child to whom the
application relates;
(c) a member of the person’s household; or
(d) any child.
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